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Abstract
This Note considers the law underlying the question addressed in Trinidad: can habeas courts
review an extraditee’s Article Three claims? In turn, this Note considers how courts should interpret the CAT in the extradition context. Part I explores the important conceptual components
of the question posed in Trinidad,including US extradition practice, habeas petitions in extradition proceedings, and the CAT’s implementation in the United States. Building on this, Part II
examines competing interpretations of Article Three claims in US courts, highlighting how these
claims touch on much deeper issues that remain unsettled by several hundred years of habeas corpus jurisprudence. Finally, Part III posits a simple answer to the straightforward question posed in
Trinidad. Neither the CAT, its implementing laws or regulations, nor the United States Constitution allows courts to hear an extraditee’s Article Three claims. Therefore, unless Congress changes
the current state of the law, Article Three claims are the exclusive purview of the Secretary.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1998, the United States implemented the UN Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (“CAT”) and made a commitment not to extradite a
person to a country where there was a substantial risk that the
individual would face torture pursuant to Article Three of the CAT.1
1. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT] (declaring, in Article Three:
“No State Party shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another State where
there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to
torture.”); Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of Reps. Submitted by States Parties Under
Article 19 of the CAT, Addendum: United States of America, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/28/Add.5
(Feb. 9, 2000) [hereinafter United States Report to CAT] (stating that the United States ratified
the CAT in October of 1994 and that it entered into force on November 20, 1994). While the
CAT entered into force in 1994, it took several years before it became law in the United States
because it was not considered self-executing. See United States Report to CAT, supra, ¶¶ 59–
60 (discussing the administrative regulations that discuss Article Three of the CAT); see also
Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring (“FARR”) Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-277, § 2242,
112 Stat. 2681, 882 (1998) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2012)) (requiring the
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Many international fugitives (“extraditees”) have claimed in US
courts that their extradition would violate Article Three (“Article
Three claims”).2 This Note follows one extraditee’s case from
beginning to end to examine the current state of the law in the United
States. The law is clear: although Article Three claims are serious and
substantial, Article Three determinations are the exclusive purview of
the Secretary of State, not the Judiciary.
On October 8, 2004, Hedelito Trinidad y Garcia was arrested in
the Central District of California pursuant to a federal complaint that
sought his extradition to the Philippines for allegedly conspiring to
kidnap for ransom.3 After several years of litigation, a US magistrate
judge certified his extradition.4 Trinidad y Garcia fought his
extradition on several fronts.5 He petitioned then-Secretary of State,
Condoleezza Rice, to deny the Philippines’ request on the grounds
appropriate federal agencies to prescribe regulations to implement US obligations under
Article Three of the CAT).
2. See, e.g., Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 955–57 (9th Cir. 2012)
(rehearing en banc) (per curiam) (requesting judicial review, in habeas, of the Secretary of
State’s Article Three determination); Mironescu v. Costner, 480 F.3d 664, 666, 676–77 (4th
Cir. 2007) (same). For a video recording of the Ninth Circuit (en banc) oral augments in
Trinidad, see United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 09–56999 Trinidad y
Garcia v Benov (June 23, 2011), http://youtu.be/GdGzu--hfPU.
3. See Garcia v. Benov, 715 F. Supp. 2d 974, 979 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (explaining that the
complaint for Trinidad y Garcia’s arrest pursuant to the extradition request was sought on
December 18, 2003, and that Trinidad y Garcia was ultimately arrested and arraigned on this
complaint on October 8, 2004).
4. See id. (stating that a US Magistrate Judge filed Trinidad y Garcia’s Certification of
Extraditability on September 7, 2007). After Trinidad y Garcia’s Certification of
Extraditability was issued by a federal magistrate judge, his first habeas petition was heard and
ultimately denied on July 16, 2008, by the District Court for the Central District of California.
See id. at 980 (discussing the first habeas denial, No. CV 07-6387-MMM, dkt. no. 43).
Subsequently, in September 2008, the Secretary of State issued a Surrender Warrant,
authorizing Trinidad y Garcia’s extradition. See id. To fight the Secretary’s decision, Trinidad
y Garcia filed a second habeas petition. See Garcia v. Benov, No. CV 08-07719-MMM (CW),
2009 WL 4250694, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2009). The District Court granted this habeas
petition, noting that because the Secretary of State refused to comply with court orders
requiring the Secretary to disclose the evidence used by the State Department in the decision to
issue a Surrender Warrant, the court had no way to find the Secretary’s decision was supported
by any substantial evidence. See id. at *6. The Government appealed this decision. See Brief
for Appellee at 27–29, Trinidad y Garcia v. Benov, No. 09-56999 (9th Cir. Mar. 25, 2010). A
panel of judges on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the District Court’s decision. See
Trinidad y Garcia v. Benov, 395 F. App’x 329, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 17840, at *332 (9th
Cir. 2010), vacated, 683 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2012) (rehearing en banc) (per curiam).
5. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 4, at 24–25 (discussing Trinidad y Garcia’s
submission to the Secretary of State, but noting that Trinidad y Garcia was denied the
opportunity to appear before any decision making body at the State Department).
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that he would face torture at the hands of Filipino officials upon his
return, in violation of the United States’ obligations under the CAT.6
Under Article Three of the CAT, the United States may not extradite
anyone who faces a “substantial risk” of torture at the hands of the
country seeking extradition (the “requesting State”).7 In 2008, after
reviewing Trinidad y Garcia’s Article Three claim, Secretary Rice
determined that Trinidad y Garcia did not face a substantial risk of
torture upon his return and authorized his surrender to the
Philippines.8
Trinidad y Garcia sought judicial review of the Secretary’s
Article Three determination by petitioning for a writ of habeas
corpus.9 A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a form of collateral
appeal that extraditees have used to challenge the legality of their
detention by arguing that international law prevents the United States
from extraditing the petitioner to the requesting State.10 After the
district court granted Trinidad y Garcia’s habeas petition and ordered
his release, the government appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which later
heard the case en banc.11 The Ninth Circuit addressed a
straightforward, but significant question: should Trinidad y Garcia be
able to demand judicial review, in habeas, of the Secretary’s Article
Three determination under the CAT?12
6. See id. at 7–9, 26 (explaining that authorities in the Philippines obtained a confession
by suffocating, electrocuting, and threatening the family of one of the co-defendants); see also
Caroline Stover, Note, Torture and Extradition: Using Trinidad y Garcia to Develop a New
Role for the Courts, 45 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 325, 326 (2013–2014) (same).
7. See CAT, supra note 1, art. III.
8. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 4, at 24–25 (explaining that Trinidad y Garcia’s
counsel learned of the existence of his Surrender Warrant on September 12, 2008); accord 22
C.F.R. § 95.3 (requiring the Secretary of State to make an Article Three determination prior to
issuing a Surrender Warrant).
9. See Garcia v. Benov, 715 F. Supp. 2d 974, 981 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (interpreting Trinidad
y Garcia’s habeas petition as arguing that his extradition would violate federal law and the
CAT); cf. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND
PRACTICE 930 (6th ed. 2014) (emphasizing that a certificate of extraditability is not a final
order within the meaning 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and so the only available appeal is through a writ
of habeas corpus).
10. See MICHAEL ABBELL, EXTRADITION TO AND FROM THE UNITED STATES: 2010, at
284 (2010) (emphasizing that habeas is the normal recourse to challenge a Certificate of
Extraditability); see also BASSIOUNI, supra note 9, at 930 (explaining that a limited appeal is
available to extraditees through habeas corpus); id. at 936–37 (listing the commonly
understood issues reviewable in habeas review of extradition hearings).
11. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
12. In the five separate opinions, the Ninth Circuit exemplified the existing discord and
confusion surrounding a seemingly straightforward question. See Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas,
683 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2012) (rehearing en banc) (per curiam).
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Trinidad y Garcia had asked the district court to examine all the
evidence underlying the Secretary’s decision regarding his claim.13 In
Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the district court had jurisdiction to review Trinidad y Garcia’s
Article Three claim, splitting with every other circuit that had
addressed this question.14 The court also held, however, that the scope
of the district court’s habeas review was strictly limited.15 Instead, the
court held that the Executive was in a better position to review the
underlying evidence, so the district court could only require the
Secretary to submit a declaration to the court with her assurances that
she had complied with her statutory duties and had “take[n] into
account all relevant considerations . . . .”16 Some scholars have
argued that this outcome, which grants sweeping authority to the
Executive, exemplifies problems with a lack of judicial review in
extradition cases more broadly and demonstrates the need for a much
broader judicial fact-finding role for Article Three claims.17
This Note considers the law underlying the question addressed in
Trinidad: can habeas courts review an extraditee’s Article Three
13. See id. at 955–56 (explaining that Trinidad y Garcia argued his surrender would
violate the CAT); Brief for Appellee at 25, Garcia v. Benov, 683 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2012)
(No. 09-56999) (explaining that Trinidad y Garcia’s second habeas petition challenged the
validity of the Secretary’s Article Three determination).
14. Compare Trinidad, 683 F.3d at 956 (holding that the district court had jurisdiction
over Trinidad y Garcia’s petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241), with id. at 969 (Tallman, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the court’s per curiam ruling created a circuit split), and Stover, supra
note 6, at 327 (pointing out that the Trinidad decision “for the first time extended judicial
review of habeas corpus petitions in extradition cases to [the Article Three
determinations] . . . .”).
15. See Trinidad, 683 F.3d at 956–57 (instructing the Secretary of State, upon remand, to
provide a declaration that she “complied with her obligations”). But see Steve Vladeck, Why
the “Munaf Sequels” Matter: A Primer on FARRA, REAL ID, and the Role of the Courts in
Transfer/Extradition Cases, LAWFARE (June 12, 2012, 9:00 AM), http://
www.lawfareblog.com/2012/06/why-the-Munaf-sequels-matter (dismissing the per curiam’s
proposed relief and saying that “merely by filing a piece of paper, the Executive Branch can
make these cases go away . . .”).
16. See Trinidad, 683 F.3d at 957 (holding that an extraditee possesses a narrow liberty
interest and is entitled to no more than a judicial finding that the Secretary complied with her
statutory and regulatory obligations). These relevant considerations include, “pattern[s] of
gross, flagrant, or mass violations of humans rights.” 22 C.F.R. § 95.2(a)(2) (2013).
17. See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 15; Stover, supra note 6; Brenna D. Nelinson,
Comment, From Boumediene to Garcia: The United States’ (Non)compliance with the United
Nations Convention Against Torture and Its Movement Away from Meaningful Review, 29 AM.
U. INT’L L. REV. 209, 250–52 (2013) (concluding that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Trinidad
gave too much discretion to the Executive Branch, and proposing a “Rule of Limited-Inquiry”
like the one proposed in Judge Thomas’s Concurrence, Trinidad, 683 F.3d at 958–61,
[Thomas, J., concurring]).
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claims? In turn, this Note considers how courts should interpret the
CAT in the extradition context. Part I explores the important
conceptual components of the question posed in Trinidad, including
US extradition practice, habeas petitions in extradition proceedings,
and the CAT’s implementation in the United States. Building on this,
Part II examines competing interpretations of Article Three claims in
US courts, highlighting how these claims touch on much deeper
issues that remain unsettled by several hundred years of habeas
corpus jurisprudence. Finally, Part III posits a simple answer to the
straightforward question posed in Trinidad. Neither the CAT, its
implementing laws or regulations, nor the United States Constitution
allows courts to hear an extraditee’s Article Three claims. Therefore,
unless Congress changes the current state of the law, Article Three
claims are the exclusive purview of the Secretary.
I. BACKGROUND ON US EXTRADITION LAW, THE CAT, AND
HABEAS CORPUS
In Trinidad, the Ninth Circuit considered many complex issues
relating to the scope of habeas corpus protections, international
extradition, and statutory interpretation.18 Part I.A begins with a
preliminary overview of US extradition practice, noting that it is a
unique process in which extraditees have historically limited options
to appeal the government’s decision to extradite.19 Subsequently, Part
I.B discusses the CAT and its implementation in the United States,
which formed the basis of Trinidad y Garcia’s amended habeas
petition.20 Finally, Part I.C provides a discussion of habeas corpus law
in the United States and the relevant US Supreme Court cases that
demonstrate how lower courts have attempted to apply the CAT in
Article Three claims like Trinidad y Garcia’s.21
A. Extradition Practice in the United States
International extradition is the formal process by which States
request the return of fugitives who have fled their jurisdiction, for the

18. See Trinidad, 683 F.3d at 952.
19. See infra notes 22–33 and accompanying text.
20. See Garcia v. Benov, 715 F. Supp. 2d 974, 981 (C.D. Cal. 2009); see also infra notes
34–61 and accompanying text.
21. See infra Part I.C.
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purpose of compelling their attendance in court.22 If an extraditee is
found in the United States, the requesting State submits a formal
extradition request via diplomatic channels for the extraditee’s
surrender, and the Department of Justice and the Department of State
review the request for compliance with applicable statutes and
treaties.23 If the extradition request survives this initial review, the
Justice Department files a complaint in the appropriate US district
court seeking a warrant for the extraditee’s arrest.24 Once
apprehended, the extraditee is brought before an extradition
magistrate for an extradition hearing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3184.25
An extradition hearing is not a criminal trial on the merits but
rather is a unique process unto itself.26 Conducting a complete trial to
approve extradition would be counterintuitive, and would require the
requesting State to come to the United States to present its
argument.27 As a result, many familiar procedures in US criminal
22. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 9, at 2 (summarizing that extradition is a formal process
where an extraditee is surrendered by the requested State to the requesting State based upon an
existing treaty, norms of international reciprocity and comity, or on the basis of a State’s
domestic laws); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 9-15.700
(1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov (describing international extradition as a process
where a person found in country is surrendered to another for trial or punishment).
23. See ABBELL, supra note 10, at 186 (explaining that formal extradition requests are
made through the diplomatic channels, from an embassy to the Department of State, and that
Provisional Arrest Requests, which are made from the requesting State’s Ministry of Justice
Directly to the Justice Department are the product of “recent extradition treaties”); UNITED
STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 22, at 9-15.700 (outlining the review procedure for
foreign extraditions requests within the Department of Justice).
24. See ABBELL, supra note 10, at 188 (establishing that, in practice, all extradition
complaints today are filed by an Assistant United States Attorney in the district where the
extraditee is found); UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 22 at 9-15.700
(directing that once the extradition request is sent to the Assistant United States Attorney, he or
she should then obtain a warrant for the extraditee’s arrest).
25. See ABBELL, supra note 10, at 26–27 (footnotes omitted) (referring to the judges and
magistrate judges who conduct extradition proceedings as “extradition magistrates”); 18
U.S.C. § 3184 (authorizing extradition magistrates to conduct hearings to examine the
requesting State’s “evidence of criminality” against the extraditee).
26. See ABBELL, supra note 10, at 189 (referring to the unique nature of extradition
proceedings); BASSIOUNI, supra note 9, at 880 (explaining the sui generis nature of extradition
hearings).
27. See, e.g., BASSIOUNI, supra note 9, at 906 (explaining that it is well-established that
extradition proceedings are not meant to determine guilt or innocence); id. at 880 (noting that
the scope of an extradition hearing is to determine that: a valid extradition treaty exists
between the United States and the requesting State; the extraditee is the person sought; the
charged offense is extraditable; the charge satisfies the dual criminality requirement; there is
probable cause to believe the extraditee committed the charged offense; the evidence is
sufficient to support probable cause; the required documents have been presented in
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trials, such as the Federal Rules of Evidence or the Federal Rules of
Criminal or Civil Procedure, are absent in extradition hearings.28
Lastly, because extradition is not meant to be a full trial, the
extradition magistrate must only find that there is probable cause that
the fugitive committed the charged offenses, rather than the familiar
“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard.29
After finding that the extraditee committed the charged
offense(s), the extradition magistrate certifies the extradition to the
Secretary, who undertakes a substantive review of the extradition
request and the expected treatment of the extraditee in the requesting
State.30 If the Secretary approves extradition, she issues a Surrender
Warrant, authorizing extradition to the requesting country.31 An
extradition magistrate’s Certificate of Extraditability is not considered
a final order within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and therefore
may not be directly appealed.32 Instead, an extraditee may collaterally
attack the Certificate by petitioning the district court for a writ of
habeas corpus.33 At issue in Trinidad, and many other extraditees’
habeas petitions, is the scope of habeas review under the CAT.
accordance with US law, any treaty requirements, duly translated, and authenticated by US
consul); ABBELL, supra note 10, at 272–75 (same).
28. See ABBELL, supra note 10, at 189, 191 (noting that neither the United States
extradition legislation, nor the Bail Reform Act of 1984, provides for bail of extraditees);
BASSIOUNI, supra note 9, at 900 (explaining that hearings are not subject to the Federal Rules
of Evidence or the Federal Rules of Civil or Criminal Procedure).
29. See ABBELL, supra note 10, at 96 (explaining that the level of proof in extradition
hearings should not vary, “irrespective of the law of the state[s involved]”); BASSIOUNI, supra
note 9, at 881 (quoting Glucksman v. Henkel, 221 U.S. 508, 512 (1911)) (explaining that
extradition magistrates are bound by treaty to presume the trial in the requesting State will be
fair, and should therefore only look for reasonable grounds of guilt); Miles v. United States,
103 U.S. 304, 312 (1880) (articulating, for the first time, the requirement that the State must
prove all elements of a crime “to the exclusion of all reasonable doubt” in criminal trials).
30. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (stating that upon the Extradition Magistrate’s certification, “a
warrant may issue . . . for the surrender of such person” by the Secretary of State) (emphasis
added); ABBELL, supra note 10, at 300–04 (pointing out that the Secretary’s review of the
extradition de novo and the Department of State generally considers any submissions from the
extraditee, although it consistently refuses to grant the extraditee any sort of oral hearing).
31. See ABBELL, supra note 10, at 295 (describing a surrender warrant as a required
document, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3186, needed to effectuate an extraditee’s extradition);
BASSIOUNI, supra note 9, at 986 (same).
32. See ABBELL, supra note 10, at 45 (citing In re Extradition of Mackin, 668 F.2d 122,
127–28 (2d Cir. 1991)) (noting that decisions denying or granting extradition requests are nor
not appealable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291); BASSIOUNI, supra note 9, at 930 (same); see
also 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (“The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district
courts of the United States . . . .”).
33. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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B. United Nations Convention Against Torture
The CAT has imposed significant legal obligations on the United
States and has often been invoked by extraditees seeking to prevent
their extradition to the requesting State.34 The Convention was
adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1984, and entered into force
in 1987.35 It is the only binding international convention exclusively
concerned with eliminating torture.36 The CAT’s preamble expresses
the desire of the State signatories to “make more effective the
struggles against torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment and punishment throughout the world.”37 Part I.B.1
provides background on Article Three, which expands the CAT’s
protections by preventing signatories from transferring individuals to
any State where their torture is likely.38 Next, Part I.B.2 discusses the
CAT’s implementation in the United States and provides the
legislative history necessary to put US policy into perspective.
34. See, e.g., 22 C.F.R. § 95.3 (requiring the Secretary to consider all allegations of
torture in extradition cases); Mironescu v. Costner, 480 F.3d 664, 666–67 (4th Cir. 2007)
(discussing the history of the CAT in the United States). In practice, however, the CAT’s new
legal obligations have not changed the practice of the US Government of refusing extradition
if torture is likely. See Convention Against Torture: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Foreign
Relations, 101st Cong. 12–18 (1990) (statement of Mark Richard, Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice, 18) [hereinafter Statement of Mark
Richard] (explaining that the Secretary of State is the “competent authority” under existing
law, and that the United States did not and would never extradite a person to a country where it
was known he would be tortured).
35. Oona A. Hathaway, Aileen Nowlan & Julia Spiegel, Tortured Reasoning: The Intent
to Torture Under International and Domestic Law, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 791, 798 (2011–2012)
(discussing the history of the CAT’s creation); C.W. WOUTERS, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
STANDARDS FOR THE PROTECTION FROM REFOULMENT: A LEGAL ANALYSIS ON THE
PROHIBITIONS ON REFOULMENT CONTAINED IN THE REFUGEE CONVENTION, THE EUROPEAN
ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, AND
THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE 426 (2009) (same).
36. See LENE WENDLAND, ASSOCIATION FOR THE PREVENTION OF TORTURE, A
HANDBOOK ON STATE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE UN CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE 66
(2002) (referring to the prohibition on torture as jus cogens, an indelible customary law that
cannot be set aside by treaty or acquiescence); WOUTERS, supra note 35, at 30 (citations
omitted) (same).
37. See CAT, supra note 1, pmbl.
38. See AHCENE BOULESBASS, THE U.N. CONVENTION ON TORTURE AND THE
PROSPECTS FOR ENFORCEMENT 219–20 (explaining that Article Three’s protections extends to
all persons); J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER
CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 126 (noting that Article
Three’s language was intended to cover all conceivable types of transfers of an individual
between States).

788

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 38:779

1. Article Three of the CAT and Extradition
The CAT imposed several obligations on the ratifying States
and, in the extradition context, Article Three is the most significant.39
Not only does the CAT require States to penalize torture, but it also
seeks to prevent instances of torture by prohibiting the transfer of
individuals to States where they face a “substantial” risk of torture.40
Article Three, Paragraph One of the CAT provides: “No State Party
shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another State
where there are substantial grounds for believing he would be in
danger of being subjected to torture.”41 This right is non-derogable, or
absolute, and “competent authorities” within a State must ensure
compliance.42 By explicitly mentioning expulsion, refoulment, and
extradition, Article Three was drafted to protect individuals from
every conceivable type of physical transfer between States.43
During the CAT’s drafting, the drafters noted the importance of
sufficiently clarifying who should be the “competent authorities.”44
Even outside of the Article Three context, procedural guarantees and
legal remedies such as habeas corpus were seen as a valuable tool to
prevent torture.45 Ultimately, however, the drafters recognized the
39. See Statement of Mark Richard, supra note 34, at 14 (stating the Article Three will
likely have the most day-to-day impact on US law enforcement); CHRIS INGLESE, THE UN
COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE, AN ASSESSMENT 83 (discussing the CAT’s new obligation
on States to prevent torture in addition to the already existing obligations not to torture).
40. See CAT supra note 1, art. 3, ¶ 1; WOUTERS, supra note 35, at 460 (citations
omitted) (explaining that “substantial grounds” in Article Three means that the risk of torture
must be assessed by the State party in question in a manner that requires more than mere
suspicion, but less than a high probability); WENDLAND, supra note 36, at 33 (stating that a
substantial ground for believing in the possibility of torture is a factual one).
41. See CAT, supra note 1, art. 3, ¶ 1.
42. See id. art. 3, ¶ 2 (discussing the role of “competent authorities”); see also MANFRED
NOWAK & ELIZABETH MCARTHUR, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE:
A COMMENTARY 147–48 (observing that the protections of Article Three are considered
absolute, as demonstrated by the CAT’s lack of exclusion or derogation clauses); WENDLAND,
supra note 36, at 33 (describing Article Three’s protections as absolute).
43. See BOULESBASS, supra note 38, at 219–20 (explaining that Article Three’s
protections extends to all persons); BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 38, at 126 (explaining
the drafters’ intent regarding the types of physical transfers protected by the CAT).
44. See NOWAK & MCARTHUR, supra note 42, at 143 (discussing the deliberations of the
drafting committee regarding Article Three, Paragraph Two of the CAT); U.N. Econ. and Soc.
Council, Report of the Working Grp. on a Draft Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, ¶¶ 20–21, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1984/72,
(Mar. 9, 1984) (same).
45. See U.N. Econ. and Soc. Council, Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment: Report by the Special Rapporteur, ¶ 44, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1986/15
(Feb. 19, 1986) (explaining the value of national procedural guarantees or legal remedies like
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diverse set of national systems governed by the CAT, so the language
was left broad.46 When competent authorities make decisions within
the meaning of Article Three, the drafters envisioned individualized
determinations.47 And while proposed versions of the text included
lists of factors to consider, they were ultimately discarded for fear of
appearing exhaustive.48 The final version of the text requires
competent authorities to take into account all relevant considerations
when analyzing allegations of torture in the requesting State.49
2. United States Implementation of its Article Three Obligations
The CAT entered into force in the United States on November
20, 1994.50 Before ratification, officials from George H.W. Bush’s
habeas corpus in preventing the torture of arrested individuals). Article Seventeen of the CAT
created the Committee Against Torture, an autonomous treaty body in the UN System that
monitors the implementation and enforcement of States’ obligations under the CAT. See
WOUTERS, supra note 35, at 426; see also WENDLAND, supra note 36, at 17. Article Twentytwo of the CAT allows the Committee to hear complaints from individuals alleging CAT
violations against States. See CAT, supra note 1, art. 22; WENDLAND, supra note 36, at 18.
The Committee’s views are only declaratory, not binding, and the CAT does not provide the
Committee any kind of enforcement mechanism. See WOUTERS, supra note 35, at 429–30.
However, the views of the Committee provide valuable insight into the international
community’s current interpretation of the treaty. See, e.g., WOUTERS, supra note 35, at 521
(explaining that, as of the date of publication, 2009, no case had been brought to the
Committee alleging an Article Three violation based upon a single fact).
46. See NOWAK & MCARTHUR, supra note 42, at 228 (stating that “Competent
Authorities” refers to administrative or judicial bodies, but given the gravity of the decision to
surrender, judicial review of all determinations is preferable); WOUTERS, supra note 35, at 516
(citations omitted) (explaining that the United Nations has not specifically delineated what
authorities may be competent within the meaning of Article Three, but has said that the
authority, which need not be part of the Judiciary, should be independent and impartial).
47. See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 38, at 51 (recounting the importance of
individualized torture determinations); CAT, supra note 1, art. 3, ¶ 2 (“For the purpose of
determining whether there are such grounds, the competent authorities shall take into account
all relevant considerations including, where applicable, the existence in the State concerned of
a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights”).
48. See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 38, at 54 (discussing the proposed text of the
International Commission of Jurists, which listed patterns of gross violations of human rights,
such as those resulting from genocide or discrimination, as factors to consider); id. at 56
(explaining that many State delegations on the drafting committee favored the deletion of
proposed text providing specific examples of situations which may present a risk of torture, for
fear of appearing to exclude non-listed factors).
49. See CAT, supra note 1, art. 3, ¶ 2 (emphasis added); WENDLAND, supra note 36, at
33 (explaining that the general human rights conditions of the requesting State should be
considered, but that those general conditions, alone, cannot be sufficient to satisfy Article
Three, as all determinations must be individualized).
50. See United States Report to CAT, supra note 1, ¶ 3 (discussing the CAT’s ratification
in the United States); Isaac A. Linnartz, Note, The Siren Song of Interrogational Torture:
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administration recommended that the Senate formally adopt an
understanding of Article Three that interpreted the “substantial risk”
standard as preventing transfer whenever torture was “more likely
than not,” which is the same standard employed in asylum
proceedings.51 Lawmakers explained Article Three would not change
the current US practice whereby the Secretary of State was the
“competent authority” to ensure that extradition never occurred
whenever torture was more likely than not.52 Lawmakers further
noted that Article Three would not alter current practice of exempting
the Secretary’s Article Three determinations from judicial review.53
Because the CAT was not considered self-executing, it would
not be binding law in the United States without implementing
legislation.54 The United States implemented its CAT obligations on
October 21, 1998, when the Foreign Affairs Reform and
Restructuring Act (the “FARR Act”) was signed into law.55 Section
2242(a) of the FARR Act declared that “it shall be the policy of the
United States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the
involuntary return of any person to a country where there are
Evaluating the U.S. Implementation of the U.N. Convention Against Torture, 57 DUKE L.J.
1485, 1495–1503 (2008).
51. See id.; see also Statement of Mark Richard, supra note 34, at 18 (recommending
that Article Three’s prohibitions apply where torture is “more likely than not,” the same
standard applied in US asylum proceedings); Linnartz, supra note 50, at 1496 (noting the State
Department’s “more likely than not” standard for Article Three determinations in extradition
cases).
52. See Statement of Mark Richard, supra note 34, at 18 (reporting that the Secretary of
State is the “competent authority” under existing law, and that the United States did not and
would never extradite a person to a country where it was known he would be tortured);
Convention Against Torture: Hearing Before the Comm. On Foreign Relations, 101st Cong.
69–72 (1990) (letter from Janet G. Mullins, Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, U.S.
Dept. of State, to Sen. Clairborne Pell) (clarifying that the Secretary will remain the competent
authority in extradition).
53. See Statement of Mark Richard, supra note 34, at 18 (explaining that the Secretary of
State’s Article Three decisions are not subject to judicial review); 22 C.F.R. § 95.4
(describing the Secretary’s Article Three Determinations as matters of Executive discretion,
not subject to judicial review).
54. 136 Cong. Rec. S17486 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (Statement of Sen. Terry Sanford
that “Articles 1 through 16 of the [CAT] are not self-executing”); Cadet v. Bulger, 377 F.3d
1173, 1180 n.3 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted) (emphasizing that, because the CAT was
not self-executing, it did not create any judicially-enforceable rights without some
congressional legislation). But see United States Report to CAT, supra note 1, ¶ 57 (citations
omitted) (explaining that US courts may take notice of US obligations under a non-selfexecuting treaty).
55. See Francois v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 645, 648–49 (3d Cir. 2006) (“On October 21,
1998, the President signed into law the [FARR Act].”); United States Report to CAT, supra
note 1, ¶ 168 (discussing the FARR Act’s enactment).
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substantial grounds for believing the person [would be subjected to]
torture.”56 Section 2242(d) discusses judicial review and explicitly
states that the FARR Act did not provide courts with jurisdiction to
hear Article Three claims outside the immigration context, which
reaffirmed existing extradition practice.57
Pursuant to § 2242(b) of the FARR Act, several federal agencies
implemented regulations setting forth how the broad statutory
language would go into effect.58 Those regulations stated that the
Secretary was the official responsible for determining whether to
surrender an individual in the extradition context, and that those
determinations were not subject to judicial review.59 While the
regulations state that the Secretary’s Article Three determinations are
not subject to judicial review, no Secretary has ever interpreted this to
mean that he or she can surrender a fugitive who faces a substantial
likelihood of torture, “[regardless of any] foreign policy interests . . .
[that] would be served by an extradition.”60 Subsequently, the United
States’ Article Three obligations were further clarified in the REAL
ID Act of 2005, which states, “notwithstanding any other provision of
law . . . or habeas corpus provision . . . a petition for review filed with
the appropriate court of appeals shall be the sole and exclusive means
for judicial review of any [Immigration] cause or claim under the
[CAT].”61

56. See FARR Act, supra note 1.
57. See id.
58. See id. (requiring administrative agencies to prescribe regulations to implement
Article Three’s obligations); accord 22 C.F.R. § 95.1-4 (implementing regulations).
59. See 95 C.F.R. § 95.2(b) (“. . . the Secretary is the U.S. official responsible for
determining whether to surrender a fugitive to a foreign country by means of extradition.”); 95
C.F.R. § 95.4 (“Decisions of the Secretary concerning surrender of fugitives for extradition are
matters of Executive discretion not subject to judicial review.”).
60. Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 989 (9th Cir. 2012) (rehearing en banc)
(Berzon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (per curiam) (quoting State Department
brief); Mironescu v. Costner, 480 F.3d 664, 671 (4th Cir. 2007). The Mironescu court stated:
Moreover, the Government concedes that the FARR Act precluded the Secretary
from extraditing Mironescu to Romania . . . if he was likely to be tortured there.
(citing Br. for the Appellants at 14) (noting that, in its argument before the district
court “[t]he Government recognized that the Secretary of State is bound by the
policy of the [CAT] as implemented by US domestic legislation and State
Department regulations, and that Mironescu thus could not be extradited to Romania
if it was likely he would indeed be tortured there”).
Id.
61. The REAL ID ACT of 2005, Pub. L. 109-13, div. B, § 106(a)(4), May 11, 2005, 119
Stat. 310–11, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 note.
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C. The Suspension Clause and the Scope of Habeas Corpus
Protections
Because a Certificate of Extraditibility is not directly appealable,
extraditees may challenge it only through a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus.62 The writ of habeas corpus—Latin for “that you have
the body”—originated in England at common law and is one of the
most fundamental methods for any prisoner to challenge their
detention.63 Extending habeas protections to the United States was so
important to the nation’s founders that Article One of the Constitution
explicitly protects habeas corpus in the Suspension Clause.64 Today
the protections of the writ also are codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
which grants courts jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions when the
petitioner’s custody violates US laws, treaties, or the Constitution.65
Scholars and jurists have struggled with the exact contours of the
kinds of claims that implicate the Suspension Clause and therefore are
protected by the Constitution.66 As the fractured Ninth Circuit opinion
in Trinidad demonstrates, the CAT adds another dimension to the
puzzle.67
62. See ABBELL, supra note 10 at 284 (emphasizing that habeas is the normal recourse
to challenge a Certificate of Extraditability); BASSIOUNI, supra note 9, at 930 (explaining that
a limited appeal is available to extraditees through habeas corpus); supra note 10 and
accompanying text.
63. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 611 (Abridged 9th ed. 2009); see Brandon L. Garrett,
Habeas Corpus and Due Process, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 47, 57–58 (2012) (arguing that the
“traditional purpose of habeas corpus is elemental but powerful: to allow a judge to review the
legality of a prisoner’s detention”). See generally Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 739–46
(2008) (providing a historical account of the writ’s development at common law and its role in
the US Constitution).
64. U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not
be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require
it.”); see also Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 739 (explaining that habeas protections were one of the
“few safeguards of liberty” in the original Constitution).
65. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1949) (“The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a
prisoner unless . . . [h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States . . . .”).
66. See Garrett, supra note 63, at 71–73 (discussing the varying scope of habeas corpus
protections in various contexts); Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 773 (explaining that Supreme Court
case law does not contain an extensive discussion of the standards defining suspension of the
writ).
67. Compare Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 956–57 (9th Cir. 2012)
(rehearing en banc) (per curiam) (holding that the district court had jurisdiction to hear
Trinidad y Garcia’s Article Three Claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2241), with id. at 1009–15
(Kozinski, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that Trinidad y Garcia’s Article Three claim did not
implicate the Suspension Clause and therefore that it was not cognizable under 28 U.S.C. §
2241).
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Part I.C.1 describes and elaborates on the most common
definition of the Suspension Clause’s protections employed by the US
Supreme Court: “[A]t the absolute minimum, the Suspension Clause
protects the writ as it existed in 1789.”68 Which rights of a detainee
were protected by the writ in 1789 is up for debate and can vary
widely depending on how a particular claim is framed.69 This
definition also demonstrates the Court’s intent not to foreclose the
possibility that the constitutional protections of the Suspension Clause
can expand beyond what existed in 1789.70 This Section uses two
seminal Supreme Court cases, St. Cyr and Boumediene, to
demonstrate how the Court has viewed the scope of Suspension
Clause protections. Part I.C.2 builds off of this framework, returning
to St. Cyr and Boumediene as evidence of the canon of constitutional
avoidance the Court employs when reading a statute to alter the
protections of the Suspension Clause.
1. Habeas Corpus as a Means of Challenging Executive Detention
In I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, the US Supreme Court discussed which kinds
of claims implicate the Suspension Clause and therefore are protected
by the US Constitution within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2241.71 It
explained that habeas protections are generally considered strongest
when the Executive Branch detains an individual with little to no
judicial involvement.72 As such, if a petitioner can successfully frame
68. I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) (quoting Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651,
663–64) (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 746
(2008) (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301).
69. How the Court frame the petitioner’s claim can be determinative. For example, in St.
Cyr, the Court adopted the petitioner’s framing of his claim, as requesting the Court’s review
of Executive detention, which was historically protected in habeas. By adopting this
interpretation, the Court necessarily rejected the respondent’s narrower definition of the claim,
as seeking review of the Executive Branch’s exercise of statutorily granted discretion. See St.
Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301; accord Ogbudimkpa v. Ashcroft, 342 F.3d 207, 220 (3d Cir. 2003)
(explaining St. Cyr’s analysis of the writ did not have a narrow focus).
70. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 746 (2008) (emphasizing that “[t]he Court has been
careful not to foreclose the possibility that the protections of the Suspension Clause have
expanded . . .” since 1789); see also, Baher Azmy, Executive Detention, Boumediene, and the
New Common Law of Habeas, 95 IOWA L. REV. 445, 462 n.89 (2010) (describing that
Supreme Court case law makes it clear that the protections of the Suspension Clause may
expand with time). But see id. at 467 (describing the criteria used by the Court to determine the
reach of the Suspension Clause as “functional and highly subjective”).
71. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 307–08 (summarizing the kinds of claims that were historically
available in habeas).
72. See id. at 301 (citation omitted) (“At its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has
served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that
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his habeas petition as asking for review of Executive detention, he has
greatly increased the likelihood that a court will find it has
jurisdiction to hear the claim.73
In St. Cyr, Enrico St. Cyr, a lawful permanent resident of the
United States, pled guilty to selling a controlled substance, a
deportable offense.74 St. Cyr was ordered removable and petitioned
for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the Attorney General
improperly refused to exercise his discretion to waive his removal
order.75 The Immigration and Naturalization Service (“I.N.S.”) argued
that, historically, habeas corpus was unavailable to review the
Executive’s exercise of statutorily granted discretion and, as a result,
St. Cyr had no basis to bring a habeas petition.76 The Supreme Court
found the I.N.S.’ historical argument “not insubstantial,” but held that
even if it assumed the Suspension Clause protected the writ only as it
existed in 1789, there was still ample evidence habeas review was
appropriate.77 The Court framed the issue more broadly than the
narrow immigration question presented and instead focused on the
scope of habeas review of Executive detention and held that, as such,
St. Cyr presented an issue that common law habeas courts could have
addressed in 1789, thus implicating the Suspension Clause.78 The
Court explained that because this was the kind of claim that
implicated the Suspension Clause, reading a statute to strip courts of
habeas jurisdiction would raise difficult constitutional questions,

its protections have been strongest.”); Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 741 (noting that by the 1600’s
in England, the writ was seen as a restraint upon the King’s power).
73. See Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 1010 (9th Cir. 2012) (rehearing en
banc) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting in part) (per curiam) (explaining that, by interpreting Trinidad
y Garcia’s Article Three claim as a challenge on Executive detention, his colleagues in other
jurisdictions viewed it “at too high a level of generality”).
74. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 293; see also, Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR), UNITED
STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/tools/glossary/
lawful-permanent-resident-lpr (last visited Jan. 5, 2015) (defining a lawful permanent resident
as a non-US citizen with authorization to live and work in the United States on a permanent
basis).
75. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 293.
76. See id. at 303 (noting that the I.N.S. was arguing in the case at bar that St. Cyr’s
claim fell outside the traditional scope of habeas).
77. Id. at 304 (discussing Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229 (1953), where the Court held
that a claim similar to St. Cyr’s was appropriate in habeas); id. (holding that “at the absolute
minimum, the Suspension Clause protects the writ as it existed in 1789”).
78. See id. at 304 (challenging the I.N.S.’s proposed interpretation of St. Cyr’s claim);
Ogbudimkpa v. Ashcroft, 342 F.3d 207, 220 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining St. Cyr’s analysis of
the writ did not have a narrow focus).
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which courts are compelled to avoid under the canon of constitutional
avoidance.79
This issue of constitutional avoidance and habeas protection in
the international context was raised several years later in Boumediene
v. Bush.80 After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the
Department of Defense established Combatant Status Review
Tribunals (“CSRTs”), which were charged with determining whether
or not individuals detained in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, were “enemy
combatants.”81 Petitioners were a group of aliens detained in
Guantanamo Bay who claimed that they had a right to seek judicial
review by petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus.82 The Government
countered that, as noncitizens detained abroad, the petitioners had no
constitutional rights and therefore no privilege of habeas corpus.83
The Government further argued that the Detainee Treatment Act of
2005 (“DTA”) and the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (“MCA”)
provided adequate non-judicial procedures for review and stripped
courts of their jurisdiction to hear petitioners’ claims in habeas.84
The Court began by determining whether the Suspension Clause,
which protects habeas corpus rights, applied to the facts at hand.85
According to the majority, the petitioners were essentially asking
whether the Constitution permitted the indefinite detention of enemy
79. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 305 (“It necessarily follows that a serious Suspension Clause
issue would be presented if we were to accept the I.N.S.’[s] submission that the 1996 statutes
have withdrawn [habeas review] from federal judges and provided no adequate substitute for
its exercise.”); see also id. at 336 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that the canon of
constitutional avoidance requires judges to presume that Congress would not enact a statute
that violates the Constitution).
80. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 787–88 (2008).
81. Id. at 733–34 (2008) (describing the post-9/11 creation of CSTRs). Once an
individual was labeled an “enemy combatant,” the US Department of Defense could detain
that person “for the duration of the particular conflict in which they were captured . . . .” Id. at
733 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004)).
82. See id. at 746 (providing factual background for the case); id. at 733 (describing the
Authorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”)), § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 50 U.S.C. § 1541,
which authorized the President to use a wide variety of tools to combat those who perpetrated
the September 11, 2011 terrorist attacks).
83. See id. at 739.
84. See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-148 §1005(e)(1), 119 Stat. 2741,
amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (providing procedures for review of status
of aliens detained as enemy combatants); Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. 109-366 §7(a),
120 Stat. 2600, 23 U.S.C.A. §2241(e), invalidated by Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723
(2008) (granting habeas corpus jurisdiction to aliens detained and determined to be enemy
combatants, or awaiting such determination); Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732–33.
85. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 739 (inquiring whether enemy combatants could invoke the
protections of the Suspension Clause).
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combatants, as defined solely by the Executive.86 It explained that
when the Constitution was drafted, the Suspension Clause was
interpreted not only to protect against arbitrary suspensions of the
writ, but also to “guarantee[] an affirmative right to judicial inquiry
into the causes of detention,”87 and to prevent the “practice of
arbitrary imprisonments.”88 The Boumediene Court held that the
Suspension Clause was implicated by the petitioners’ claim, thus
expanding the Suspension Clause and the right to judicial review in
habeas to non-citizen enemy combatants detained in Guantanamo
Bay.89
2. Congress May Alter the Scope of Habeas Protections
Once a court decides that a claim implicates the Suspension
Clause, any law that strips a court’s jurisdiction to hear that claim
would raise difficult constitutional questions.90 This Section discusses
the Supreme Court’s attempt to avoid such difficult constitutional
questions, continuing to rely on St. Cyr and Boumediene as
examples.91 The language of the statutes at issue in St. Cyr—the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)
and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility

86. See id. at 788 (interpreting petitioners’ most basic claim as arguing “that the
President has no authority under the AUMF to detain them indefinitely”)
87. Id. at 744 (citations omitted).
88. Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 84. (Alexander Hamilton))
89. This was because, although 1789 represented a bare minimum of the Suspension
Clause’s protections, “[t]he Court ha[d] been careful not to foreclose the possibility that the
protections of the Suspension Clause have expanded along with post-1789 developments . . . .”
Id. at 746 (2008) (citing I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 553 U.S. 289, 300–01 (2001)); see Gerald L.
Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause After Boumediene v. Bush, 110 COLUM. L.
REV. 537, 544 (2010) (arguing that Boumediene demonstrated that “the mandate of the
Suspension Clause does go beyond the floor of 1789”).
90. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 314 (explaining that reading the statutes at issue in St. Cyr to
preclude habeas review of a pure question of law would “raise serious constitutional
questions”); Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause After I.N.S. v. St. Cyr,
33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 555, 558 n.17 (2002) (explaining that in a companion case,
Calcano-Martinez v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 348 (2001), the Court held that no such serious
constitutional questions were raised by a judicial review provision that which removed habeas
jurisdiction from the courts of appeals, because habeas remained available in the district
court).
91. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 299 (explaining that multiple interpretations of a statute are
possible, but one raises “serious constitutional problems” courts are obligated to interpret the
statute “to avoid such problems”); Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 787 (articulating courts’
obligations to construe statutes to avoid constitutional problems).
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Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”)—was very similar to that of the FARR Act.92
As such, many lower courts have considered St. Cyr’s analysis highly
relevant to their analysis of Article Three claims.93 By contrast,
Boumediene marks the first and only time in US history where the
Court held that Congress has passed a law stripping habeas
jurisdiction in violation of the Suspension Clause.94 Therefore,
Boumediene provides a concrete example of how difficult it is for
Congress to violate the Suspension Clause by merely stripping habeas
jurisdiction.
The Court in St. Cyr explained that to avoid the constitutional
problems that may arise when a petitioner’s claim implicates the
Suspension Clause, courts should employ two rules of statutory
interpretation.95 First, Congress can only strip the courts’ jurisdiction
to hear that claim with a sufficiently clear statement that “articulate[s]
specific and unambiguous statutory directives to effect a repeal [of
habeas jurisdiction].”96 Second, even where a sufficiently clear
statement of intent exists, a court will search for an alternative
interpretation of the statute that would not raise these problems.97
In applying these two rules to the AEDPA and the IIRIRA, the
St. Cyr Court held that neither statute removed United States district
courts’ jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 because they failed to
provide a sufficiently clear statement demonstrating Congress’ intent
to strip habeas review.98 Further, an alternative interpretation of the
92. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (amending §212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952);
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996); see also St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289.
93. See Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 955–957 (9th Cir. 2012) (rehearing
en banc) (per curiam) (examining St. Cyr to adjudicate Trinidad y Garcia’s Article Three
claim). But see Mironescu v. Costner, 480 F.3d 664, 676 (4th Cir. 2007) (concluding that St.
Cyr was not dispositive on the Article Three Claim at issue because the FARR Act contained
no plausible reading that would not strip habeas review, unlike the statutes analyzed in St.
Cyr).
94. See Neuman, supra note 89, at 538 (explaining that, before Boumediene, the Court
had never before found a violation of the Suspension Clause).
95. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 299.
96. Id. at 289, 299 (citing Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. 85, 8 Wall. 85, 102, 19 L. Ed. 332
(1869), where the Court stated, “We are not at liberty to except from [habeas corpus
jurisdiction] any cases not plainly excepted by law.”).
97. See id. at 299 (explaining that multiple interpretations of a statute are possible, but
one raises “serious constitutional problems” courts are obligated to interpret the statute “to
avoid such problems”).
98. See id. at 312–13 (holding that neither statute “speaks with sufficient clarity” to bar
habeas review).
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statute that did not raise constitutional problems was available.99 The
Court considered the text of § 401(e) of the AEDPA, but concluded
that the text did no more than amend provisions of the 1952
Immigration and Nationality Act, which made no mention of habeas
or § 2241.100 Because the text in the AEDPA did not contain a clear
statement removing habeas jurisdiction, § 401(e)’s title, “Elimination
of Custody Review by Habeas Corpus,” was irrelevant.101 Further, the
Court analyzed three different sections of the IIRIRA, §§ 1252(a)(1),
1252(b)(9), and 1252(a)(2)(C).102 The language in each of these
sections failed to provide clear language effecting repeal of habeas
jurisdiction, as they only discussed “judicial review” or “jurisdiction
to review,” which were “historically distinct” from habeas corpus in
the immigration context.103
By contrast, in Boumediene, the Court held that the statutes at
issue not only contained a sufficiently clear statement of Congress’
intent to strip habeas jurisdiction, but also that there was no fair
alternative interpretation of the statute that did not strip habeas
jurisdiction.104 After holding that the Constitution and, by extension,
the Suspension Clause had “full effect” in Guantanamo Bay, the
Court in Boumediene addressed the issue of whether or not § 7 of the
MCA violated the Suspension Clause by stripping federal courts of

99. Id. at 289, 314 (refusing to adopt the I.N.S.’s interpretation of the statutes, as doing
so would raise serious constitutional questions).
100. Section 507(e) of the AEDPA that the Court analyzed read as follows:
(e) Elimination of Custody Review by Habeas Corpus.—Section 106(a) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1105a(a)) is amended—(1) in
paragraph (8), by adding ‘and’ at the end; (2) in paragraph (9), by striking;
‘and’ at the end and inserting a period; and (3) by striking paragraph (10).
See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 308 n.31.
101. Id. at 308–09 (explaining that a provision’s title is not controlling, and since the text
did not repeal habeas jurisdiction, the title could not either).
102. See id. at 309–12 (analyzing § 1252(a)(1), which stated that judicial review of final
removal orders is governed only by the Hobb’s Act); id. (analyzing § 1252(b)(9), which stated
that “judicial review of all questions of law and fact and application of constitutional or
statutory provisions” arising under the subchapter shall only be available in judicial review of
a final order under this section); id. (analyzing § 1252(a)(2)(C), which stated “Notwithstanding
any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to review any final order of
removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed” certain offenses).
103. See id. at 311. The Court cited several Supreme Court cases that differentiated
judicial review from habeas corpus in immigration statutes. Id. (citing Heikkila v. Barber, 345
U.S. 226 (1953)) (“[I]t is the scope of inquiry on habeas corpus that differentiates” habeas
review from “judicial review.”).
104. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 736 (2008) (analyzing § 7 of the MCA).
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jurisdiction to hear petitioners’ habeas claims.105 Because the
Suspension Clause was implicated, the Court required a clear
expression of Congressional intent to strip habeas and noted that the
statutes at issue had such a clear intent as they were clearly enacted
by Congress to “circumscribe habeas review.”106 Further, there was
no fair alternative interpretation of the statutes that did not clearly
remove petitioners’ right to seek habeas relief.107 Without habeas, the
petitioners’ claims could never be adequately heard, as the nonjudicial review procedures that Congress implemented with the act
were an inadequate substitute for the writ.108 Absent some acceptable
alternative forum that could adequately replace habeas review, the
petitioners’ constitutional rights, as guaranteed by the Suspension
Clause, had been violated.109 Because of these flaws, the Court held,
for the first time in the nation’s history, that a law passed by Congress
improperly attempted to remove the Judiciary’s ability to inquire into
these traditional questions, and thus, violated the Suspension
Clause.110

105. Section 7 of the MCA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) to read:
(1) No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an
application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien
detained by the United States who has been determined by the United States to
have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such
determination.
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 772 (2008).
106. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 776–77 (noting that the DTA only allows the court of
appeals to determine whether or not the CSRT complied with review procedure set out by the
Secretary of Defense—not engage in any de novo review).
107. See id. at 723, 738–39 (noting that the statute’s text was amended by Congress after
the Court’s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, and that this legislative response
made it even clearer that Congress intended a singular construction of this portion of the
MCA).
108. See id. at 794 (explaining the existence of suitable alternative processes was a
“relevant consideration in determining the courts’ role”). The Court also explained that it was
“troubled” by the fact that the statute did not explicitly allow the Court of Appeals to order the
detainee released. See id. at 787–88 (assuming that congressional silence on the matter meant
that the statute would permit release, as it was a “constitutionally required remedy”).
109. See id. at 733 (holding that § 7 of the MCA was an unconstitutional suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus).
110. See id. at 770 (recognizing that this decision marked the first time the Court had
“held that noncitizens detained by our Government in territory over which another country
maintains de jure sovereignty have any rights under our Constitution”); id. at 799 (Souter, J.,
concurring) (“Justice Scalia is thus correct that here, for the first time, this Court holds there is
. . . constitutional habeas jurisdiction over aliens imprisoned by the military outside an area of
de jure national sovereignty.”).
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The Court further explained that although there was little
precedent that spoke directly to what constituted a removal of habeas
rights, several factors to consider were: whether the statute at issue
substantially departed from common law habeas procedures; whether
the statute applied to proceedings with prior judicial involvement;
whether the statute’s purpose or effect was to restrict the writ; and
whether the statute substituted a new collateral review procedure for
pre-existing habeas corpus procedure.111
3. Habeas Review in Extradition is Governed by the Rule of NonInquiry
In contrast to the traditional scope of habeas review addressed in
the enemy combatant context of Boumediene or the immigration
context of St. Cyr, the scope of habeas review in the extradition
context has traditionally been limited by the Rule of Non-Inquiry.112
This common law doctrine bars habeas courts that review extradition
decisions from considering the “procedures or treatment” that an
extraditee may face upon surrender to the requesting State.113 When
the Supreme Court formally adopted the Rule of Non-Inquiry in the
early twentieth century in Neely v. Henkel, it explained that even US
citizens who commit crimes abroad cannot complain to US courts
when they are “required to submit to such modes of trial and to such

111. See id. at 774–76 (citations omitted) (setting forth factors that could be seen to
constitute a removal of habeas protections, including: substantial departure from common law
habeas procedure, whether the purpose and effect of a particular statute was to restrict the writ,
and whether the statute substituted some new collateral process for habeas review).
112. See ABBELL, supra note 10, at 46–7 (describing the Rule of Non-Inquiry as a partial
judicial delegation of decision making responsibility to the Secretary); id. at 267–69 (noting
the near unanimous judicial acknowledgment that the Executive is better suited to inspect,
monitor, and safeguard the conditions an extraditee may face in the requesting State);
BASSIOUNI, supra note 9, at 940 (acknowledging that the Rule of Non-Inquiry generally
prohibits habeas courts from inquiring into the treatment the extraditee is likely to receive in
the requesting State).
113. See The Supreme Court 2007 Term Leading Cases: II. Federal Jurisdiction and
Procedure: B. Habeas Corpus: Jurisdiction over Americans Held Overseas, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 405, 415 (2008) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted) (citing Hoxha v. Levi,
465 F.3d 554, 563 (3d Cir. 2006)) [hereinafter Jurisdiction over Americans Held Overseas]
(referring to the Rule of Non-Inquiry as a judge made doctrine limiting the scope of judicial
review in extradition); see also David B. Sullivan, Abandoning the Rule of Non-Inquiry in
International Extradition, 15 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 111, 116 (stating the Rule of
Non-Inquiry is often invoked when an extraditee challenges extradition on the basis of the
expected treatment in the requesting State).
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punishment as the laws of that country may prescribe . . . .”114
Further, the Rule recognizes that some branches of the federal
government are comparatively more able to address foreign policy
questions than the courts.115 As a result, the Rule of Non-Inquiry only
restricts review by the Judiciary and does not prohibit the Executive
Branch from examining the conditions in the requesting State.116 The
Executive Branch, through the Secretary of State, is thought to be in
the best position to review Article Three claims regarding the
potential for mistreatment in the requesting State and to potentially
refuse extradition because they have the ability to investigate the
conditions in a foreign country and precondition extradition on
assurances by the foreign government regarding the specific
conditions that await an extraditee.117 Even prior to implementing
obligations under the CAT, the Secretary of State had a clear policy
of refusing extradition where torture was likely.118
114. See Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 123 (1901); see also Jurisdiction over
Americans Held Overseas, supra note 113, at 415. As a consequence, courts reviewing habeas
petitions in extradition cases have historically been limited to reviewing questions related to
the Executive’s authority to extradite, the validity of the applicable extradition treaty, and
other narrow questions. See Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 1009 (9th Cir. 2012)
(rehearing en banc) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting in part) (per curiam) (enumerating the specific
issues generally addressed in habeas).
115. See ABBELL, supra note 10, at 47 (observing that the Rule of Non-Inquiry’s
decision making delegation to the Executive Branch is particularly evident in cases involving
political or humanitarian concerns); Jacques Semmelman, Federal Courts, the Constitution,
and the Rule of Non-Inquiry in International Extradition Proceedings, 76 CORNELL L. REV.
1198, 1229–30 (1991) (arguing that US courts are less able to navigate foreign policy interests
than the Secretary).
116. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 9, at 636 (stating that the Executive branch may inquire
into the treatment facing an extraditee and refuse to surrender, at its discretion); Peroff v.
Hylton, 563 F.2d 1099, 1102–03 (4th Cir. 1977) (noting, in dicta, the Rule of Non-Inquiry
applies to the Judiciary while simultaneously allowing the Executive to be flexible). But see
BASSIOUNI, supra note 9, at 638 (observing increasing dicta in US courts indicating a
willingness to erode the Rule of Non-Inquiry if there is evidence that the extraditee will face
torture in the requesting State).
117. See John Quigley, The Rule of Non-Inquiry and Human Rights Treaties, 45 CATH.
U.L. REV. 1213, 1217 (1996) (noting the Rule of Non-Inquiry is premised upon the Secretary’s
ability to exercise independent discretion to deny extradition); BASSIOUNI, supra note 9, at 611
(defining diplomatic assurances as formal representations from a competent representative of
the requesting State regarding an individual’s extradition); ABBELL, supra note 10, at 300–04
(explaining that, as a matter of Executive discretion, the Secretary of State imposes conditions
to which the requesting State must agree before extradition can occur); Munaf v. Geren, 553
U.S. 674, 701–02 (2008) (citations omitted) (explaining that the political branches are better
suited to address issues affecting the ability of other sovereign nations to exercise jurisdiction
over fugitives from their justice system).
118. See Statement of Mark Richard, supra note 34, at 18 (reporting, prior to US
ratification of the CAT, that the United States did not and would never extradite a person to a
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The Rule of Non-Inquiry was recently reaffirmed by a
unanimous Supreme Court in Munaf v. Geren, which applied the Rule
of Non-Inquiry within the military detainee context, holding that
“habeas is not a means of compelling the United States to harbor
fugitives from the criminal justice system with undoubted authority to
prosecute them.”119 The Court consolidated the habeas petitions of
two individuals detained by the United States military, both men were
dual US-Iraqi citizens who had voluntarily traveled to Iraq.120 The
petitioners challenged their transfer to Iraqi criminal custody on the
grounds that they would face torture in Iraqi custody.121 The Court
noted that principles of international comity and respect for foreign
States prohibit courts from shielding citizens from foreign
prosecutions.122
The Munaf Court believed that the petitioners’ torture claims
were best addressed by the political branches, not the Judiciary.123 It
explained that the Judiciary was not suited to second-guess the
Executive’s determinations in this area, which would require courts
not only to judge foreign justice systems but also to undermine the
Government’s ability to speak with one voice in foreign relations.124
According to the Court, the Judiciary lacked the significant
diplomatic leverage and tools possessed by the political branches.125
Further, the Court noted that denying habeas review did not end the
country where it was known he would be tortured); cf. Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d
952, 962–63 (rehearing en banc) (Tallman, J., dissenting) (per curiam) (“I cannot question so
lightly the honor of the Secretary . . . .”).
119. Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 697 (2008); accord John T. Parry, International
Extradition, the Rule of Non-Inquiry, and the Problem of Sovereignty, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1973,
1976 (2010); Juarez-Saldana v. United States, 700 F. Supp. 2d 953, 957 (W.D. Tenn. 2010)
(arguing that the Court, in Munaf, reaffirmed the principles supporting the Rule of NonInquiry).
120. See Munaf, 553 U.S. at 679 (describing the facts underlying the case).
121. See id. at 700.
122. See id. at 698–99 (quoting Omar v. Harvey, 479 F.3d 1, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2007))
(Brown, J., dissenting in part) vacated by 553 U.S. 674.
123. See id. at 700 (using the Rule of Non-Inquiry from extradition cases to limit the
scope of habeas review in the military detainee context); Id. at 700–01 (citing Neely v. Henkel,
180 U.S. 109, 123 (1901)) (explaining how inter-branch comity had a long history in the
Court’s jurisprudence).
124. Id. at 702. The Court also recognized that the Judiciary was not well suited to
second-guess decisions of foreign justice systems. See id. (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, (J.
Madison) (“If we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other
nations.”)).
125. Id. at 703 (quoting Omar v. Harvey, 479 F.3d at 20 n.6 (Brown, J., dissenting in
part) vacated by 553 U.S. 674).
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petitioners’ ability to advocate their position as the Executive retained
discretionary power to decline to surrender them to Iraqi
authorities.126 Finally, the Court noted that US policy prevented
transfer where torture was likely.127
Article Three claims like Trinidad y Garcia’s pose several
unique issues, such as the CAT’s effect on an extraditee’s petition for
review of the Secretary’s Article Three determination.128 Although St.
Cyr, Boumediene, and Munaf do not involve the CAT or the FARR
Act, like Trinidad, they did set the stage for Part II by explaining the
difficulty courts have framing a petitioner’s claims and interpreting
statutes that affect a court’s habeas jurisdiction. First, Part I discussed
habeas corpus jurisprudence in the United States, using St. Cyr and
Boumediene as examples to demonstrate the constitutional nature of
habeas protections and the applicable canons of statutory
interpretation needed to understand the arguments explored in
subsequent Parts of this Note.129 Second, Part I explained how the
Court’s unanimous opinion in Munaf reaffirmed the principal that
international extradition is a unique process in the US legal system,
with a historically limited scope of review.130
II. THE CAT, THE FARR ACT, AND STATE DEPARTMENT
REGULATIONS HAVE CAUSED TREMENDOUS CONFUSION
AMONG US COURTS
The jurisprudence surrounding habeas review of extraditees’
Article Three claims is inconsistent, and courts are split at several
different levels of the analysis.131 Some jurists differ on whether or
not a cognizable claim exists on habeas, and even among those that
126. Id. at 702 (describing the role of the Secretary).
127. Id. at 702 (explaining that the Solicitor General stated that it was US policy not to
transfer if torture were likely and that while torture concerns remained in Iraq, torture was not
believed to be practiced by Justice Ministry, to whom petitioners would be transferred).
128. Compare Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 955–57 (9th Cir. 2012)
(rehearing en banc) (per curiam) (framing the Article Three claim requesting judicial review of
the Secretary’s Article Three determination as constitutional), with Juarez-Saldana v. United
States, 700 F. Supp. 2d 953 (W.D. Tenn. 2010) (refusing to find a statutory grant of
jurisdiction over Article Three claims from the FARR Act).
129. See supra notes 71–111 and accompanying text
130. See supra notes 119–127 and accompanying text.
131. Compare Trinidad, 683 F.3d at 955–57 (comparing the Article Three claim to a
petition for review of Executive detention), with Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130, 142–43 (2d
Cir. 2003) (interpreting a foreign national’s Article Three claim as asking for review of an
erroneous statutory interpretation).
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agree that the claim exists, there is disagreement about whether it is
the type of claim that implicates the Suspension Clause or was created
by subsequently enacted laws, namely the FARR Act.132 Other courts
believe that Congress has effectively stripped courts of jurisdiction to
hear the claim.133
Part II examines these different points of view using the various
opinions from Trinidad as a roadmap. Exploring the per curiam
decision, Part II.A considers different arguments regarding whether
Article Three claims are cognizable in habeas. Part II.A.1 examines
the reasoning behind the per curiam opinion in Trinidad and other
cases holding that Article Three claims implicate the Suspension
Clause and thus require using the rules of statutory interpretation from
St. Cyr. Part II.A.2 then considers the second part of the per curiam
opinion in Trinidad, which says that the cause of action for Article
Three claims has been created by statutes or regulations implementing
the CAT. Part II.B then addresses the effect that various statutes,
including the FARR Act and the REAL ID Act, discussed in
Trinidad, have had on Article Three claims. Specifically, Part.II.B
examines whether Congress is free to take away from courts the
habeas jurisdiction that is created in prior statutes.
A. Finding the Source of Article Three Claims
Twenty-eight U.S.C. § 2241 allows courts to hear habeas
petitions when the petitioner’s custody violates the US
Constitution.134 The Supreme Court, in turn, has explained that a
habeas petitioner states a cognizable constitutional claim when the
claim implicates the Suspension Clause, and that the Suspension
Clause is implicated, at a minimum, when the claim is of the same
type that a detainee could have brought in 1789.135 Part II.A addresses
these issues in the context of an extraditee’s Article Three claim.
132. See, e.g., Trinidad, 683 F.3d at 1009 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting in part) (stating that
Trinidad y Garcia’s Article Three claim was not cognizable on habeas); Mironescu v. Costner,
480 F.3d 664, 674 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that § 2242(d) of the FARR Act only created
habeas jurisdiction for Article Three claims in the immigration context).
133. See Omar v. McHugh, 646 F.3d 13, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that the language
of the REAL ID Act effectively stripped courts of habeas jurisdiction, if any ever existed for
military transferees).
134. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
135. See I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) (describing 1789 as the absolute
minimum of the protections of the Suspension Clause); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723,
739 (2008) (characterizing legal precedents and commentaries regarding habeas corpus in
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1. Article Three Claims and the Suspension Clause—Looking to
History to Frame the Claim
The manner in which a court frames a petitioner’s Article Three
claim is crucial to its analysis.136 Courts often look to historical
precedent and examine whether the same general type of claim would
have been available to the petitioner in 1789, and therefore whether it
implicates the Suspension Clause.137 In the extradition and detainee
transfer context, there is disagreement among jurists and scholars
about whether Article Three claims would have been cognizable in
1789.138
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Trinidad marked the first
decision from a US Circuit Court of Appeals that “extended judicial
review of habeas corpus petitions in extradition to [Article Three
determinations].”139 The court first considered whether it had
jurisdiction to hear Trinidad y Garcia’s Article Three claim and held
that, as a noncitizen challenging Executive detention, Trinidad y
Garcia’s claim historically would have been protected in habeas.140 In
his concurrence, Judge Thomas went even further, arguing that even
if jurisdiction had only been created by 28 U.S.C. § 2241, removing
jurisdiction in this particular context would remove all forms of
judicial review for Trinidad y Garcia’s claim, which was so contrary

1789 as instructive). But see id. at 746 (recognizing that the Court has been careful not to say
that the Suspension Clause protects only what it protected in 1789).
136. Compare Trinidad, 683 F.3d at 955–57 (9th Cir. 2012) (framing the Article Three
claim as constitutional and finding habeas jurisdiction), and Wang, 320 F.3d at 142–43 (2d
Cir. 2003) (same, in immigration context), with Juarez-Saldana v. United States, 700 F. Supp.
2d 953 (W.D. Tenn. 2010) (framing the Article Three claim as seeking review of the
conditions in the foreign country and not finding habeas jurisdiction).
137. See Omar, 646 F.3d at 15, (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Boumediene, 533 U.S. at 746)
(arguing that the historical scope of habeas mattered, and guided the “question before [the
court]”); Mironescu v. Costner, 480 F.3d 664, 676 (4th Cir. 2007) (recognizing 1789 as a
benchmark for reviewing Article Three claims).
138. See Vladeck, supra note 15 (noting the split between US Circuit Courts regarding
habeas jurisdiction over Article Three Claims); Trinidad, 683 F.3d at 969 (Tallman, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the court’s per curiam ruling created a circuit split). But see, e.g.,
Cadet v. Bulger, 377 F.3d 1173, 1182, 1183 n. 8 (11th Cir. 2004) (demonstrating agreement in
the immigration context of the effect of jurisdictional statutes on habeas proceedings).
139. Stover, supra note 6, at 327–28; see Vladeck, supra note 15 (noting the split
between US Circuit Courts regarding habeas jurisdiction over Article Three Claims).
140. While the court was not explicit on this point, it seems that the court is arguing that
by virtue of the Constitutional underpinning of Trinidad y Garcia’s Article Three Claim,
jurisdiction was technically provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2241, as the per curiam decision based its
holding on due process. See Trinidad, 683 F.3d at 956.
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to the purpose of the Suspension Clause that such a result would
violate the Constitution.141
While habeas protections are strongest in the context of
Executive detention, some courts argue that Article Three claims in
the extradition context do not seek review of the legality of Executive
detention and therefore conclude that habeas review is improper.142
For example, in his partial dissent in Trinidad, Chief Judge Alex
Kozinski criticized the per curiam’s authors for over-generalizing
Trinidad y Garcia’s claim.143 In his view, Trinidad y Garcia did not
challenge “the authority of the Executive to extradite him,” but rather,
he challenged the destination he would be extradited to: the
Philippines.144 As there was no support for the proposition that habeas
courts had ever reviewed an extraditee’s treatment abroad, there was
no basis for jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.145
In Chief Judge Kozinski’s view, St. Cyr was easily
distinguishable because refusing to hear Trinidad y Garcia’s claim
could create no constitutional question.146 This was because “[a]
serious constitutional question would only arise if [the court]
interpreted a statute to preclude the type of habeas review protected
by the Constitution’s Suspension Clause.”147 Instead, Trinidad y
Garcia’s claim was essentially one of statutory and regulatory
interpretation, which did not fall under the category of claims that
141. See id. at 959–60 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that Suspension Clause was
intended to provide a judicial forum for inquiry into the causes of Executive detention, and
reading the FARR Act to remove all judicial forums would violate the intent of the Suspension
Clause); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (“The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a
prisoner unless . . . [h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States . . . .”).
142. Compare Saint Fort v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 191, 199 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting I.N.S.
v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001)) (explaining that habeas protections are strongest in the
context of Executive detention), with Omar, 646 F.3d at 25–29 (Griffith, J., concurring) (D.C.
Cir. 2011) (explaining that the Article Three Claim of the petitioner, a military detainee, was
not eligible for habeas review).
143. See Trinidad, 683 F.3d at 1010 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting in part) (explaining that
his colleagues characterized Trinidad’s claim “at too high a level of generality . . . .”).
144. Id. at 1011 (“Trinidad y Garcia . . . challenges . . . the destination to which the
Executive seeks to extradite him . . . .”).
145. See id. at 1009–11 (framing the history of extradition case law in terms of the Rule
of Non-Inquiry). Chief Judge Kozinski elaborated on his statutory interpretation by noting that
the FARR Act and the REAL ID Act “explicitly disavow any congressional intent to create
jurisdiction for review of CAT claims outside a limited immigration context.” Id. at 1010.
146. See id. at 1010 (explaining that St. Cyr did not apply because, unlike the case at bar,
there was no historical evidence that Trinidad y Garcia’s claim was cognizable on habeas).
147. See id. at 1010–11 (citing St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 314).
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implicate the Suspension Clause—i.e., claims cognizable in 1789.148
Because Trinidad y Garcia’s Article Three claim was narrower than
his colleagues suggested, Chief Judge Kozinski would have dismissed
Trinidad y Garcia’s claim for lack of jurisdiction.149
Similar to the discord regarding the application of St. Cyr to
Article Three claims, jurists and scholars have disagreed on the
applicability of Munaf to Article Three claims.150 On remand from
the Supreme Court in Munaf, the D.C. Circuit heard the amended
habeas petition of Shawqi Omar, who asked the court to consider
whether the FARR Act and Article Three of the CAT could be used to
enjoin his transfer to Iraqi custody.151 Omar argued that he was
entitled to habeas review because his claim implicated the Suspension
Clause.152 The court read the Munaf decision as categorical and held
that, as a military detainee, Omar was not in a class that possessed a
right to judicial review of the conditions he might face upon
transfer.153 This was because “[h]abeas corpus [was] not a valid
means of inquiry into the treatment the [petitioner] is anticipated to
148. See id. at 1010 (contrasting Munaf, where the Court considered constitutional
claims, to the current case).
149. See id. at 1011–12 (quoting Semmelman, supra note 115, at 1218 (“[n]o court has
yet denied extradition based upon the defendant’s anticipated treatment in the requesting
country.”).
150. Compare Omar v. McHugh, 646 F.3d 13, 19–21 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (explaining that
military transferees could not historically bring habeas petitions in these situations), with
Vladeck, supra note 15 (arguing that Munaf was explicitly limited to its facts and should not
control Article Three claims in the extradition context), and Parry, supra note 119, at 2015
(expressing surprise that the Court in Munaf did not go further to expressly ban all inquiry).
151. The Supreme Court in Munaf declined to reach Omar’s Article Three claim, as he
had not advanced it in his initial habeas petition. Moreover, the Court expressed doubt that
Omar could present a cognizable claim under the FARR Act. See Omar, 646 F.3d at 16–17
(citing Munaf, 553 U.S. at 703 n.6.). Omar was one of the petitions whose claim was heard by
the Supreme Court in Munaf. His amended petition was brought before the D.C. Circuit on
remand from Munaf. See Omar, 646 F.3d 13.
152. See Munaf, 553 U.S. at 704 (quoting Brief for Habeas Petitioners 54) (noting that
the Petitioner argued that the Constitution prevented the Government from transferring him to
Iraq “without legal authority”).
153. See Omar, 646 F.3d at 19–21 (explaining that military transferees could not
historically bring habeas petitions in these situations). The court dispatched Omar’s Due
Process argument quickly, noting that Munaf also foreclosed Omar, as a military transferee,
from making this argument. See id. at 20 (“[T]the Supreme Court unanimously ruled in Munaf
that transferees such as Omar (indeed, Omar himself) do not possess a habeas or due process
right to judicial review of conditions in the receiving country.”); cf. Mironescu v. Costner, 480
F.3d 664, 671 (4th Cir. 2007) (explaining that extraditees could not claim constitutional
entitlement to habeas review of post extradition treatment “prior to the CAT and the FARR
Act”).
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receive in the requesting state.”154 By contrast, one scholar
distinguishes the Article Three claim in Trinidad from Munaf by
noting that the Munaf decision was expressly limited to its facts, as
indicated by the Justices’ opinions.155 First, Chief Justice Roberts,
writing for a unanimous court, noted that the Secretary had already
determined that the detainees in Munaf would not be tortured, a
determination that was not reflected in the record before the court in
Trinidad.156 Second, Justice Souter explained in his concurrence that
the result likely would be different in a situation where the probability
of torture was well-documented but the Executive failed to
acknowledge it.157 The discord regarding the application of Munaf
and St. Cyr squarely demonstrates the heart of the issue addressed in
this Note and in Trinidad: whether extraditees have a constitutional
right to habeas review for Article Three claims. Many jurists,
however, would only consider this to be the first half of the analysis.
2. Article Three Claims and the FARR ACT—Looking to Statutes to
Frame the Claim
If the right to habeas does not directly stem from § 2241’s
jurisdictional grant over constitutional questions, habeas may be
supported by reading the FARR Act in conjunction with a
constitutional right.158 For example, the per curiam opinion in
Trinidad looked to the FARR Act’s implementing regulations and
interpreted them to create an obligation on the Secretary to review the
petitioner’s claim, thus creating a procedural due process interest
reviewable in habeas.159 That due process interest, however, was
limited, and the per curiam would only require the Secretary to

154. Omar, 646 F.3d at 19 (citing Munaf, 553 U.S. at 700).
155. See Vladeck, supra note 15.
156. See id. (explaining that the Court settled the merits of Munaf’s claim by looking to
the Secretary of State’s assurance that the petitioners would not face torture, which had not
occurred in Trinidad). Article Three in Trinidad claim was further distinguishable because
Munaf explicitly chose not to address any issues related to the FARR Act, as they were not
raised by the parties. See id.
157. See Vladeck, supra note 15 (discussing Justice Souter’s concurrence in Munaf).
158. See Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 956–57 (9th Cir. 2012) (rehearing
en banc) (per curiam) (holding that the FARR Act and its implementing regulations, which are
binding domestic law, require the Secretary to determine that an extraditee is not more likely
to be tortured than not).
159. See id.
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provide the court with a declaration confirming that she complied
with her duties under Article Three of the CAT.160
In contrast, Judge Pregerson’s concurrence in Trinidad argued
that the Secretary’s “closed” review process and the significant
consequences of any error in her Article Three determination required
courts to exercise habeas review of Article Three claims.161 Although
cognizant of the serious concerns surrounding classified information,
Judge Pregerson argued that the district court, in camera, was able to
review the underlying evidence of Trinidad y Garcia’s Article Three
claim.162 Similarly, Judge Berzon read the FARR Act and the CAT to
require some manner of habeas inquiry that accessed the sufficiency
of the Secretary’s evidence and conclusions.163 According to Judge
Berzon, habeas is, first and foremost, an adaptable remedy.164
Because of this, he went on to propose a novel “Rule of Limited
Inquiry,” which would frame the scope and process of habeas review
on a case by case basis, by balancing the severity of the Secretary’s
foreign policy concerns against the perceived risk of torture readily
apparently from the preexisting extradition record.165
Limited judicial review of Article Three claims was also
discussed by the Fourth Circuit in Mironescu v. Costner, where the
court explained in dicta that a district court, in camera, is well-suited
to deal with the real and substantial confidentiality concerns
associated with Article Three claims.166 In Mironescu, the Fourth
Circuit held that the Rule of Non-Inquiry did not bar habeas review of
160. See id. at 956–57 (instructing the Secretary of State, upon remand, to provide a
declaration that she “complied with her obligations”); see also Nelinson, supra note 17, at
237–38 (referring to the lack of judicial oversight of the Secretary’s Article Three
determination as an “explicit derogation of [the CAT]”); Stover, supra note 6 (arguing that the
lower courts should take a more proactive role in hearing Article Three claims in the first
instance).
161. See Trinidad, 683 F.3d at 1008 (referring to the Secretary’s declaration as
“barebones”); cf. Vladeck, supra note 15 (criticizing this formulization for allowing the
Secretary to make these petitions “go away” by “merely by filing a piece of paper”).
162. See Trinidad 683 F.3d at 1008 (arguing for the district court to review Trinidad y
Garcia’s claim in camera).
163. See id. at 987 (Berzon, J., concurring) (arguing that if the Secretary approved
extradition without making a determination regarding Trinidad y Garcia’s Article Three claim,
that would “illegal under positive, Congressionally enacted law”).
164. See id. at 997 (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008)).
165. See id. at 997–99 (proposing a Rule of Limited Inquiry); see also Nelinson, supra
note 17, at 251–52 (supporting Judge Berzon’s formulation of judicial review).
166. See Mironescu v. Costner, 480 F.3d 664, 673 (4th Cir. 2007) (expressing
confidence in the ability of the district court to protect the confidentiality of communications
between the Executive and foreign governments).
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the extraditee’s Article Three claims because the CAT and FARR Act
created a due process right to have his extradition preceded by an
Article Three determination.167 The Rule of Non-Inquiry could not
bypass the court’s duty to ensure that the Executive complied with its
constitutional duties.168 The Mironescu court reasoned that a district
court could only ensure this compliance by examining the evidence
underlying the Secretary’s Article Three determination.169
Other jurists have adopted a different reading of the FARR Act
and the REAL ID Act to conclude that because the statutes say
nothing about creating jurisdiction in the extradition context, they
should not be read to do so in conjunction with either the Suspension
Clause or § 2241.170 For example, both Chief Judge Kozinski, in his
dissent in Trinidad, and the D.C. Circuit, in Omar, have noted that the
FARR Act only addresses habeas review in the immigration context,
and therefore it cannot be read to create a cause of action for Article
Three claims in any other context.171 Similarly, Judge Tallman’s
dissent in Trinidad argued that the FARR Act’s policy statement
created no individual rights, and was mere policy, not law.172 Lastly,
the D.C. Circuit explained that since the FARR Act, the REAL ID
Act of 2005 had been enacted, which contained explicit language
limiting habeas review to the immigration context.173 Because Article
Three claims do not implicate the Suspension Clause, the D.C. Circuit
167. Although Mironescu was decided before Munaf, it reaches the same conclusion as
Vladeck, supra note 15, by similarly arguing that the Rule of Non-Inquiry does not apply to
Article Three claims. Mironescu, 480 F.3d at 673 (holding that the Rule of Non-Inquiry did
not bar review of the Secretary’s Article Three determination).
168. See Mironescu, 480 F.3d at 673 (acknowledging the Constitution as the supreme
law of the land).
169. See id. (contending that the Secretary’s compliance must be subject to judicial
review).
170. See, e.g., Jaurez-Saldana v. U.S., 700 F. Supp. 2d 953, 960 (holding that the text of
the FARR Act cannot be read to create habeas jurisdiction for an extraditee’s Article Three
claim).
171. See, e.g., Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 1010 (9th Cir. 2012)
(rehearing en banc) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting in part) (per curiam) (concluding that the FARR
Act and REAL Id Act confirm the absence of habeas jurisdiction); Omar v. McHugh, 646 F.3d
13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (stating that the FARR Act’s language only provides for judicial
review in the immigration context).
172. See Trinidad, 683 F.3d at 975–77 (explaining that the FARR Act did not create
binding law, but was an example of Congress legislating “by innuendo,” or guiding the
Secretary in making the ultimate regulations that would have the force of law).
173. See Omar, 646 F.3d at 18 (holding that, even if some source of habeas jurisdiction
could be found for petitioners, the language of the REAL ID Act effectively stripped courts of
habeas jurisdiction outside the immigration context).
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did not apply St. Cyr’s statutory cannons to the REAL ID Act, further
bolstering its argument against finding a statutory basis for Article
Three claims in habeas.174
Because 28 U.S.C. § 2241 allows courts to hear habeas petitions
when the petitioner’s custody violates US laws, treaties, or the
Constitution, courts addressing Article Three claims must first decide
whether an extraditee presents a cognizable habeas claim.175 Part
II.A.1 began by considering whether Article Three claims implicate
the Suspension Clause, therefore supporting a constitutional basis for
habeas jurisdiction.176 Part II.A.2 examined whether these claims
could have been created after 1789 by the CAT, the FARR Act, or its
implementing regulations.177 Part II.B continues by discussing the
next issue courts address in Article Three claims—whether
Congressionally-enacted statutes have stripped courts of jurisdiction
to hear the petitioner’s claim.
B. Has Congress Stripped Courts of Habeas Jurisdiction Over Article
Three Claims?
Even among those that find some basis to support a petition for
the writ, there is disagreement regarding whether the CAT’s
implementing legislation (the FARR Act) and regulations strip courts’
habeas jurisdiction to hear Article Three claims.178 Some courts, in
comparing the text of the FARR Act with the statutes analyzed in St.
Cyr, note the near identical language and hold that the FARR Act
does not effectively strip jurisdiction, however this holding requiring
the application of St. Cyr’s canons of statutory interpretation.179 For
174. Id. at 24 n.11 (stating that the Article Three claim brought by a military detainee or
an extraditee did not state a constitutional claim).
175. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
176. See supra notes 136–157 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 158–1774 and accompanying text.
178. Compare Mironescu v. Costner, 480 F.3d 664 (4th Cir. 2007) (interpreting the
FARR Act to prohibit habeas review of Article Three claims outside the immigration context),
with Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2012) (rehearing en banc) per
curiam) (explaining that the FARR Act didn’t have a sufficiently clear statement to strip
habeas jurisdiction).
179. See Ogbudimkpa v. Ashcroft, 342 F.3d 207, 217 (3d Cir. 2006) superseded by
statute, REAL ID ACT of 2005, Pub. L. 109-13, div. B, § 106(a)(4), May 11, 2005, 119 Stat.
310–11, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 note, as recognized in Francois v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 645, 647 (3d
Cir. 2010) (holding, in an immigration context, that the statutory language examined in St. Cyr
as “closely mirror[ing]” the language in the FARR Act). See generally Trinidad, 683 F.3d 952
(applying the canons of statutory interpretation used by the Supreme Court in St. Cyr).
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example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Trinidad held that
because Trinidad y Garcia’s claim was historically protected in
habeas, the canons of statutory interpretation used in St. Cyr
controlled, meaning that Congress could not strip habeas jurisdiction
without a “particularly clear statement” demonstrating congressional
intent to strip.180 Even if a statute has a sufficiently clear statement,
the opinion noted that courts must address whether an alternative
interpretation of the statute, that does not raise a potentially difficult
constitutional question, is possible.181 According to a majority of
judges, the FARR Act lacked a sufficiently clear statement to strip
jurisdiction.182 Further, the REAL ID Act, which the court read to
contain a sufficiently clear statement to strip habeas jurisdiction,
could also be alternatively interpreted as only affecting Article Three
habeas jurisdiction in the immigration context—an interpretation that
the court felt would not offend the Constitution.183
By contrast, after holding that the extraditee had a due process
right to have an Article Three determination, the Fourth Circuit in
Mironescu held that the FARR Act’s language was sufficient to strip
that right.184 The Fourth Circuit distinguished St. Cyr by explaining
that St. Cyr’s statutory interpretation was premised on the fact that, in
the immigration context, there are substantial differences between the
terms “judicial review” and “habeas corpus.”185 Because there was no
such distinction of those terms in the extradition context, the court
interpreted the FARR Act’s use of “judicial review” to also preclude

180. See Trinidad, 683 F.3d at 956 (requiring a clear expression of congressional intent
to strip habeas jurisdiction).
181. See id. (explaining that Supreme Court precedent mandates adopting
constitutionally sound interpretations of statutes if fairly possible).
182. See id. This is all the per curiam opinion said on this subject, but they cited to Saint
Fort v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 191, 200–02 (1st Cir. 2003) (explaining that the FARR Act did not
explicitly refer to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, or to habeas review generally, and so Supreme Court
precedent counseled against reading it as stripping habeas jurisdiction) and Wang v. Ashcroft,
320 F.3d 130, 140–42 (2d Cir. 2003) (interpreting St. Cyr as requiring a statute to mention
either “habeas corpus” or “28 U.S.C. § 2241” before it can be sufficient to repeal habeas
jurisdiction) for support. See Trinidad, 683 F.3d at 956.
183. See id. (finding an alternative interpretation of the REAL ID Act).
184. See Mironescu v. Costner, 480 F.3d 664, 676 (4th Cir. 2007) (refusing to require
Congress to always explicitly mention habeas corpus or § 2241 to effectuate a repeal of habeas
jurisdiction).
185. See id. at 676 (arguing that St. Cyr, as an immigration case, was distinguishable
because in the immigration context, the terms habeas corpus and judicial review have
“historically distinct meanings”).
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habeas review for Article Three claims.186 The court explained that
the Supreme Court had never explicitly stated that Congress must
mention “habeas” or “§ 2241” to bar habeas review, and so it adopted
what it interpreted to be the FARR Act’s unambiguous demonstration
of Congressional intent.187
Still other courts have found the language of the REAL ID Act
sufficient to strip habeas jurisdiction over Article Three claims.188 In
Omar, the D.C. Circuit stated that even if the FARR Act created a
judicially enforceable right, Congress retained the right to
subsequently remove that right without having to adhere to St. Cyr’s
statutory canons.189 According to the court, to hold otherwise would
advance a “one-way ratchet theory” of habeas protections, where any
expansion of habeas rights by Congress would essentially be treated
as an amendment to the Constitution.190 If the petitioner sought to
enforce a right created by the FARR Act, that right would be, by
definition, a statutory right.191 Article Three claims could not gain the
protections of the Suspension Clause merely because they were
labeled habeas claims.192 Because the petitioner’s claim was not of a
class that was historically cognizable in habeas, no constitutional
problems arose by stripping the court’s jurisdiction and the
petitioner’s right to bring the claim.193 Therefore, the court did not
apply St. Cyr’s rules of statutory interpretation, and it read the plain

186. See id. at 676 (reading the FARR Act’s preclusion of habeas jurisdiction to include
the consideration of Article Three claims).
187. See id. at 666 (noting that even though the Supreme Court had implied that would
require such language, until it did, they would not adopt such a stringent view).
188. See, e.g., Omar v. McHugh, 646 F.3d 13 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
189. See id. at 22 (arguing that congress does not amend the constitutional protections of
the writ when it adds some new statutory protection to habeas petitioners).
190. See id. at 22–23 (dismissing the logic underpinning this one-way ratchet theory);
see also Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 384–85 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (finding no
constitutional problem when Congress partially retracts statutory enlargement of habeas
rights); I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 342 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (labeling this oneway ratchet argument as “too absurd to be complicated”). But see Neuman, supra note 90, at
590 (arguing that Scalia’s dissent in St. Cyr incorrectly assumed that the Suspension Clause’s
protections are fixed by Eighteenth Century practice).
191. See Omar, 646 F.3d at 22 (explaining that statutory expansions of the writ of habeas
corpus do not alter the scope of the Suspension Clause).
192. See id. at 23 (citing LaGuerre v. Reno, 164 F.3d 1035, 1038 (7th Cir. 1998))
(explaining that curtailing an optional statutory enlargement of habeas corpus does violate the
Constitution).
193. See id. at 22 (reasoning that even if the FARR Act created habeas jurisdiction, the
REAL ID Act subsequently stripped that jurisdiction without any constitutional problem).
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language of the REAL ID Act as clearly precluding habeas review of
Article Three claims outside the immigration context.194
There is a short history underlying the jurisprudence of Article
Three claims.195 Part II summarized the conflicting opinions of US
jurists and scholars attempting to interpret murky Supreme Court
precedent from Munaf, St. Cyr, and Boumediene. The disagreement
among jurists is based partly on the fact that Article Three claims can
be framed in many different ways, each requiring a very different
analysis.196 Further, even among courts that reach the same result,
they do not necessarily rely on the same legal reasoning to reach that
result.197 While Article Three claims present many difficulties, Part III
will demonstrate that the current state of the law allows for only one
result.
III. THE LAW IS CLEAR: US COURTS DO NOT HAVE
JURISDICTION TO REVIEW EXTRADITEES’ ARTICLE THREE
CLAIMS IN HABEAS
Article Three claims are not cognizable in US courts on petitions
for writs of habeas corpus. Part III.A begins by framing Article Three
claims and calling them what they really are: requests for judicial
review of an extraditee’s expected treatment in the requesting State.
Part III.A.1 explains that this is the only plausible interpretation
because Article Three claims did not exist historically, and therefore,
they cannot implicate the Suspension Clause. Moreover, as Part
III.A.2 argues, neither the CAT nor its implementing statutes and
regulations created any judicial cause of action. Finally, Part III.A.3
demonstrates that even if one interprets the CAT, the FARR Act, or
194. See id. at 18 (holding that the petitioner, a military transferee, was not of a class that
would have historically had access to habeas relief).
195. The CAT did not enter into force in the United States until 1994, while habeas was
first codified in the United States with the Judiciary Act of 1789. Compare Garrett, supra note
63 (explaining that habeas was first codified in the Judiciary Act of 1789), with United States
Report to CAT, supra note 1, ¶ 3 (stating that the CAT went into force in the United States in
1994).
196. See, e.g., Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 1010 (9th Cir. 2012)
(rehearing en banc) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting in part) (per curiam) (arguing that because
Trinidad y Garcia’s claim did not implicate the Suspension Clause, his colleagues on the Ninth
Circuit incorrectly applied the canons of constitutional avoidance from St Cyr).
197. Compare Mironescu v. Costner, 480 F.3d 664 (applying the canons of
constitutional avoidance from St. Cyr to find that the FARR Act strips habeas jurisdiction),
with Trinidad, 683 F.3d at 952 (applying the same canons from St. Cyr to find hold the FARR
Act did not contain a sufficiently clear statement to strip habeas jurisdiction).
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its implementing regulations as creating a claim cognizable on habeas
review, none would preclude Congress from subsequently stripping
habeas jurisdiction because Article Three claims do not implicate the
Suspension Clause and the rules of statutory interpretation used in St.
Cyr’s would not apply. Therefore, the plain text of the REAL ID Act
would clearly strip courts of jurisdiction to hear the claim. There are
real and substantial inter-branch and international comity concerns
that accompany judicial review of the Secretary’s Article Three
determinations, and Part III.B concludes by recognizing this.
However, it also recognizes the incredibly high stakes faced by any
extraditee who makes an Article Three claim. These claims should be
dealt with as completely and fairly as possible. But as this Note
concludes, despite the split amount US Circuit Courts, the current
state of the law is clear, and US courts do not have habeas jurisdiction
over Article Three claims.
A. Article Three Claims Ask Courts to Review an Extraditee’s
Expected Treatment in the Requesting State
When an extraditee brings an Article Three claim in habeas, the
first issue a court must address is: what relief is being sought?198
Article Three of the CAT protects against extradition where there is a
substantial risk of torture in the requesting State.199 When making an
Article Three claim to a US court, an extraditee is clearly asking a
court to determine whether that risk is substantial.200 Courts may
determine whether there is a substantial risk of torture only by going
beyond the extradition record.201

198. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text.
200. See WOUTERS, supra note 35, at 428 (stating the United States interprets
“substantial grounds” in Article Three to mean that torture is “more likely than not”);
Statement of Mark Richard, supra note 34, at 18 (recommending that Article Three’s
prohibitions apply where torture is “more likely than not,” the same standard applied in US
asylum proceedings).
201. See ABBELL, supra note 10, at 203–34 (explaining that the US Government
generally submits the requesting State’s formal extradition request as evidence in extradition
hearings); BASSIOUNI, supra note 9, at 906 (quoting 6 MAJORIE WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 998–99 (1963)) (explaining that it is well-established that extradition
proceedings are not meant to determine guilt or innocence and that an extraditee generally
cannot introduce evidence that is not specifically required by the applicable treaty).
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When examining the rights and obligations created by the
Suspension Clause, history matters.202 The Court has made it clear
that at a minimum the protections of the Suspension Clause exist as
they did in 1789.203 Because St. Cyr’s statutory claim could not have
existed in 1789, the Court had to frame the claim more broadly, as
challenging the legality of Executive detention, the historic core of
the writ.204
1. Article Three Claims Do Not Implicate the Suspension Clause
Article Three claims cannot be framed so broadly.205 Although
Article Three of the CAT creates similar obligations for the United
States in both the immigration and extradition contexts, it does not
abrogate centuries of extradition case law by creating habeas
jurisdiction for courts.206 Moreover, even though St. Cyr noted that
habeas protections are strongest in the context of Executive detention,
the court implicitly recognized that that was an inappropriately broad
level of abstraction, and discussed at length how immigration case
law supported habeas review.207 Boumediene is further
distinguishable because an extraditee does not face the prospect of
indefinite Executive detention.208 Although extradition habeas is
limited in scope by the Rule of Non-Inquiry, it still provides
extraditees an “affirmative right to judicial inquiry into the causes of
[their] detention.”209 In reality, Article Three claims do not seek
judicial review of the causes of detention, but rather a determination
202. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 746 (2008) (explaining the importance of
seeking historical guidance in habeas cases); I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 304 (2001)
(describing the understanding of habeas corpus in 1789 as the “absolute minimum” of the
protections of the Suspension Clause).
203. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 304.
204. See id. at 301 (indicating that “[a]t its historical core” habeas corpus allowed for
judicial review of Executive detention).
205. See Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 1011 (9th Cir. 2012) (rehearing en
banc) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting in part) (per curiam) (refusing to frame the Article Three
claim before the court as challenging Executive detention).
206. See Omar v. McHugh, 646 F.3d 13, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (reading the FARR Act to
provide a right to judicial review of Article Three claims only in the immigration context);
BASSIOUNI, supra note 9, at 940 (stating habeas corpus has been held by courts not be a valid
means of inquiry into expected treatment in the requesting State).
207. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 306–07 (discussing the historical application of
immigration laws in habeas cases challenging Executive detention).
208. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 788 (discussing the possibility that detention may be
indefinite).
209. Id. at 744 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton)).
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that torture is likely, meaning that their surrender to the requesting
country—their release from United States custody—violates the
CAT.210 Finally, as the Court noted in Munaf, the Judiciary cannot
assume that the Executive is oblivious to its humanitarian duties and
presume that the Secretary of State has decided not to deny
extradition where denial is required by law.211
2. Article Three Claims Were Not Created by Statute
The Suspension Clause protects claims that are of a class that
would have been cognizable in 1789—this does not include Article
Three claims.212 In the extradition context, the Rule of Non-Inquiry
remains in the background.213 Article Three claims are the precise
type of claim that the Rule of Non-Inquiry forecloses: those that call
for examining the conditions that an extraditee may encounter upon
his return to the requesting State.214 Therefore, although the Court has
never defined the upper limits of the Suspension Clause’s protections,
it seems unlikely that it would include Article Three Claims.215
If an Article Three claim is not contemplated by the Suspension
Clause, then petitioners must argue that it comes from some new
right.216 That is exactly the argument accepted by the Ninth Circuit in
Trinidad when they held that the United States’ new obligations under

210. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008) (noting that release to foreign
criminal custody is the “last thing petitioners want”).
211. Id. at 702 (quoting Omar v. Harvey, 479 F.3d 1, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Brown, J.,
dissenting in part) vacated, 553 U.S. 674; accord Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952,
962–63 (rehearing en banc) (Tallman, J., dissenting) (per curiam) (“I cannot question so lightly
the honor of the Secretary . . . .”).
212. See, e.g., BASSIOUNI, supra note at 9, at 940 (stating habeas corpus has been held
by courts not be a valid means of inquiry into expected treatment in the requesting State);
Trinidad, 683 F.3d at 1010 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting in part) (writing that Trinidad y Garcia
had not presented any case to support a holding that the Rule of Non–Inquiry allowed for even
minimal review).
213. See supra notes 112–27 and accompanying text.
214. See ABBELL, supra note 10, at 267–69 (noting the near unanimous judicial
acknowledgment that the Executive is better suited to inspect, monitor, and safeguard the
conditions an extraditee may face in the requesting State); BASSIOUNI, supra note 9, at 940
(acknowledging that the Rule of Non-Inquiry generally prohibits habeas courts from inquiring
into the treatment the extraditee is likely to receive in the requesting State).
215. See supra Part II accompanying text (discussing various lines of thought related to
the CAT’s effect on an extraditee’s rights in habeas proceedings).
216. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (extending the writ of habeas corpus to prisoners only
where custody violates the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States).
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the CAT created Trinidad y Garcia’s cause of action.217 Though
accepted by the Ninth Circuit, this argument is unavailing.218 First, the
CAT itself did not create the claim because it was not self-executing,
and therefore not legally binding in US courts.219 Second, neither the
CAT’s implementing legislation, the FARR Act, nor the subsequently
promulgated regulations can reasonably be read to create a cause of
action for an Article Three claim.220 Not only should the FARR Act’s
broad policy statement not be read to create an individually
enforceable right, the legislative history clearly demonstrates that
Congress intended the Secretary of State to remain the competent
authority to determine whether an extraditee faces a substantial risk of
torture.221
3. Even if a Court Erroneously Finds a Jurisdictional Basis for Article
Three Claims, Congress Has Stripped That Jurisdiction
Even if a court could read the CAT, the FARR Act, or the
implementing regulations to create a habeas claim, then the court
must examine whether Congress has subsequently revoked that
claim.222 In St. Cyr, the Court explained that the clear statement rule
217. See Trinidad, 683 F.3d at 956–57 (arguing that the FARR Act and its implementing
regulations, which were binding domestic law, created a cognizable Due Process interest,
reviewable in habeas).
218. See id. at 1010 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting in part) (explaining that his colleagues
characterized Trinidad’s claim “at too high a level of generality”); cf. Omar v. McHugh, 646
F.3d 13, 19–21 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (explaining that military transferees could not historically
bring habeas petitions to argue a claim akin to a modern Article Three claim).
219. Trinidad, 683 F.3d at 972–72 (Tallman, J., dissenting) (explaining non-selfratifying treaties are not binding US law unless Congress enacts implementing statutes); 136
Cong. Rec. S17486 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (Statement of Sen. Terry Sanford) (stating that
Articles 1 through 16 of the CAT are not self-executing). But see United States Report to CAT,
supra note 1, ¶ 57 (citations omitted) (explaining that US courts may take notice of US
obligations under a non-self-executing treaty).
220. FARR Act § 2242(d) (stating that the Act did not provide courts with jurisdiction to
hear Article Three claims outside the immigration context); 22 C.F.R. § 95.4 (describing the
Secretary’s Article Three Determinations as matters of Executive discretion, not subject to
judicial review); accord Omar, 646 F.3d at 17 (stating that the FARR Act’s language only
provides for judicial review in the immigration context.
221. See Statement of Mark Richard, supra note 34, at 18 (reporting that the Secretary of
State is the “competent authority” under existing law, and that the United States did not and
would never extradite a person to a country where it was known he would be tortured);
Convention Against Torture: Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 101st Cong.
69–72 (1990) (letter from Janet G. Mullins, Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, U.S.
Dept. of State, to Sen. Clairborne Pell) (clarifying that the Secretary will remain the competent
authority in extradition).
222. See supra notes 178–97 and accompanying text.
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requires that a statute must unambiguously state its intention to
revoke habeas review when such a revocation would create “a serious
Suspension Clause issue.”223 The Court’s definition of the Suspension
Clause creates a very clear floor: 1789.224 While Boumediene made it
clear that the protections of the Suspension Clause can be expanded,
there has never been any indication that it has expanded to include
Article Three claims.225 Further, the CAT, which entered into force in
the United States in 1994, and the FARR Act, which was signed into
law in 1998, simply have not existed for a long enough time to create
a right to judicial review that is so foundational in US law that its
revocation could create serious constitutional issues.226
In contrast to the short history of the CAT’s binding legal status
in the United States, the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed over a
century of well-settled extradition case law—i.e., the Rule of NonInquiry—demonstrating that inquiring into the extraditee’s expected
treatment in the requesting State is the exact opposite of
foundational—it is forbidden.227 Therefore, neither the CAT, the
FARR Act, nor the REAL ID Act constitutes a removal of habeas
rights, as defined in Boumediene.228 First, none require courts to
depart from common law habeas procedures because the common law
is framed by the Rule of Non-Inquiry.229 None limit the status quo of

223. I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 305 (2001).
224. See id. at 301 (describing 1789 as the absolute minimum of the protections of the
Suspension Clause).
225. See Neuman, supra note 89, at 589 (explaining how the Boumediene Court chose
not to even attempt to elaborate the full scope of the protections of the Suspension Clause).
226. See Omar v. McHugh, 646 F.3d 13, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (arguing that Congress
does not amend the constitutional protections of the writ when it adds some new statutory
protection to habeas petitioners); supra note 1 and accompanying text (describing the CAT’s
implementation in the United States).
227. See supra notes 112–27 and accompanying text (discussing the Rule of Non-Inquiry
and its importance to the Court’s holding in Munaf).
228. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 774–76 (2008) (citations omitted) (setting forth
factors that could be seen to constitute a removal of habeas protections, including: substantial
departure from common law habeas procedure, whether the purpose and effect of a particular
statute was to restrict the writ, and whether the statute substituted some new collateral process
for habeas review).
229. Compare supra note 111 and accompanying text (discussing factors that could be
seen to constitute a removal of habeas protections), with BASSIOUNI, supra note 9, at 940
(acknowledging, that in the extradition context, the Rule of Non–Inquiry generally prohibits
habeas courts from inquiring into the treatment the extraditee is likely to receive in the
requesting State).
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judicial involvement in habeas review.230 Secondly, their “purpose or
effect” is not to restrict the writ, as they cannot restrict the writ in a
situation to which it has never applied.231 Because Article Three
claims do not implicate the Suspension Clause, their revocation by
Congress would not create serious constitutional questions.232 As
such, the clear statement requirement used in St. Cyr does not apply;
normal canons of statutory interpretation do.233 Therefore, even if a
court read the FARR Act as creating a cognizable habeas claim, the
REAL ID Act clearly revoked that claim by clarifying that only
immigration detainees had a right to judicial review of the conditions
in the requesting State.234
B. Supreme Court Precedent Makes It Clear that the Rule of NonInquiry Precludes Habeas Review of Article Three Claims
Historically, courts have followed the Rule of Non-Inquiry, and
kept the scope of habeas review in extradition very narrow.235 The
Rule of Non-Inquiry has its underpinnings in principles of
international comity and horizontal separation of powers between the
branches of the Federal Government; these concerns existed in the

230. Compare supra note 111 and accompanying text (discussing factors that could be
seen to constitute a removal of habeas protections), with BASSIOUNI, supra note 9, at 880
(describing the scope of an extradition hearing), and BASSIOUNI, supra note 9, at 930–36
(explaining the process and scope of habeas in extradition).
231. Compare supra note 111 and accompanying text (discussing factors that could be
seen to constitute a removal of habeas protections), with BASSIOUNI, supra note at 9, 940
(stating habeas corpus has been held by courts not be a valid means of inquiry into expected
treatment in the requesting State); c.f. Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 1012 (9th
Cir. 2012) (rehearing en banc) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting in part) (per curiam) (arguing that
the there was not, nor had there ever been any jurisdiction basis for Trinidad y Garcia’s Article
Three claim).
232. See Omar v. McHugh, 646 F.3d 13, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (arguing that Congress
does not amend the constitutional protections of the writ when it adds some new statutory
protection to habeas petitioners); Trinidad, 683 F.3d at 1010–11 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting in
part) (arguing that an Article Three claim does not implicate the Suspension Clause).
233. I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299–300 (2001) (explaining that whenever a statute
invokes the outer limits of congressional power, the Court will require a clear expression that
Congress intended that particular result); Trinidad, 683 F.3d at 1010–11 (Kozinski, C.J.,
dissenting in part) (arguing that, because an Article Three claim is not constitutional in nature,
there is no need to require a clear expression of congressional intent).
234. See Omar, 646 F.3d at 18 (holding that the language of the REAL ID Act
effectively stripped courts of habeas jurisdiction, if any ever existed for military transferees).
235. See supra notes 112–27 and accompanying text (discussing the Rule of NonInquiry).
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nation’s early history, and they exist today.236 Although Munaf
concerned the transfer of military detainees, its affirmance of the
principals underlying the Rule of Non-Inquiry was critical to its
holding.237
Congress is of course free to amend the current law and expand
the scope of habeas review to include Article Three claims.238
However, as the Court made clear in Munaf, not only is the Judiciary
ill-suited to examine the substance of the Secretary’s Article Three
determinations, judicial review would damage American foreign
affairs and the Executive’s ability to speak with one voice.239 Further,
Munaf reaffirmed another longstanding principal that US courts
should not pass judgment on foreign legal proceedings or systems.240
Therefore, the Court’s decision in Munaf only makes it clearer that
US Courts are not the proper forum for an extraditee’s Article Three
claim.
Some courts and commentators, perhaps inadvertently, have
implied that the Secretary may not always comply with Article Three
of the CAT in the extradition context.241 If the potential for torture or
mistreatment in the requesting State is ever at issue, the Secretary is
required to consider the risk of torture, and cannot issue a Surrender
Warrant if there are substantial grounds to believe torture is more
236. See Quigley, supra note 117, at 1217 (1996) (noting the Rule of Non-Inquiry is
premised upon the Secretary’s ability to exercise independent discretion to deny extradition);
Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 701 (2008) (citing The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7
Cranch 116, 143) (explaining that the political branches are better suited to address issues
affecting the ability of other sovereign nations to exercise jurisdiction over fugitives from their
justice system).
237. See Parry, supra note 119, at 2015 (discussing the extradition precedents that the
Court used to support its decision in Munaf); Juarez-Saldana v. United States, 700 F. Supp. 2d
953, 957 (W.D. Tenn. 2010) (arguing that the Court, in Munaf, reaffirmed the principles
supporting the Rule of Non-Inquiry).
238. See supra notes 158–97 (discussing Congress’s ability to amend the scope of
habeas review within the limits of the Suspension Clause).
239. See Munaf, 553 U.S. at 702 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (J. Madison)
(recognizing that the Judiciary is not well suited to second-guess decisions of foreign justice
systems (“If we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other
nations.”)).
240. Munaf, 553 U.S. at 699–700 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398 (1964)) (discussing the Act of State doctrine).
241. See Vladeck, supra note 15 (criticizing the lack of review required in Trinidad as it
would allow the Secretary to make Article Three claims “go away” “merely by filing a piece
of paper”); Munaf, 553 U.S. at 702 (refusing to question, as the petitioner requested, that the
Secretary complied with her humanitarian duties); Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952,
962–63 (9th Cir. 2012) (rehearing en banc) (Tallman, J., dissenting) (per curiam) (criticizing
the other judges in the Ninth Circuit for questioning the “honor of the Secretary”).
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likely than not.242 Additionally, as part of the Secretary’s de novo
review of the extradition request, the Secretary will consider any
submissions from the extraditee.243 Lastly, only the Secretary can
impose conditions on extradition by requiring the requesting State to
provide diplomatic assurances regarding humanitarian concerns.244
CONCLUSION
Article Three claims are not cognizable in US courts.245 As a
matter of law, Article Three claims are not of the type that would
have been cognizable on habeas, nor has Congress subsequently made
them cognizable.246 As a policy matter, this approach is consistent
with US extradition practice, consistent with notions of inter-branch
comity underlying that practice, and consistent with the United States’
obligations under the CAT.247 Well before implementing the CAT,
basic notions of human decency required the Secretary to ensure
extraditees’ would not face torture in the requesting State—that
obligation continues today.248 While the CAT created legal
obligations for the United States, it did not change the federal
Judiciary’s role in international extradition—only the US Congress
can do that.249
This Note sought only to resolve conflicting interpretations of
the CAT and its implementing statutes and regulations. Many have
argued that evolving notions of human rights should affect US
extradition practice.250 This Author does not disagree. However, the
242. See 22 C.F.R. § 95.3 (requiring the Secretary of State to make an Article Three
determination prior to issuing a Surrender Warrant); Trinidad, 683 F.3d at 956–57 (holding
that the FARR Act and its implementing regulations, which are binding domestic law, require
the Secretary to determine that an extraditee does not face a substantial likelihood of torture).
243. See ABBELL, supra note 10, at 300–04 (pointing out that the Secretary’s review of
the extradition de novo and the Department of State generally considers any submissions from
the extraditee, although it consistently refuses to grant the extraditee any sort of oral hearing)
244. See supra note 117 and accompanying text (discussing diplomatic assurances).
245. See supra Part III.
246. See supra Part III.A.
247. See supra Part III.B.
248. Statement of Mark Richard, supra note 34, at 18 (reporting that the United States
did not and would never extradite a person to a country where it was known he would be
tortured).
249. See supra notes 158–97 (discussing Congress’s ability to amend the scope of
habeas review within the limits of the Suspension Clause).
250. See Nelinson, supra note 17, at 237–38 (referring to the lack of judicial oversight of
the Secretary’s Article Three determination as an “explicit derogation of [the CAT]”); Stover,
supra note 6 (arguing that the lower courts should take a more proactive role in hearing Article
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reality is that the US Supreme Court has not said that evolving
notions of human rights should affect courts’ interpretations of the
Suspension Clause.251 The only way to change the current procedures
surrounding extraditees’ Article Three claims is through
Congressional action. For the reasons set out above, the Judiciary
simply is not equipped to ensure compliance with the CAT. However,
recognizing this does not mean that the Secretary’s review process
need be as opaque as it was for Trinidad y Garcia.252

Three claims in the first instance); supra notes 163–65 (discussing Judge Berzon’s proposal
for a Rule of Limited Non-Inquiry from Trinidad, which would balance human rights concerns
and international comity concerns to design novel habeas review procedures for Article Three
claims on a case-by-case basis).
251. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 697 (2008) (reaffirming the Rule of NonInquiry). It is true that the Supreme Court’s Opinion in Boumediene expanded the protections
of the Suspension Clause to non-citizen detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, but that
expansion was based on functional factors. See Azmy, supra note 70, at 467 (describing the
criteria used by the Court to determine the reach of the Suspension Clause as “functional and
highly subjective”).
252. Brief for Appellee at 14–25, Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952 (9th Cir.
2012) (rehearing en banc) (per curiam) (No. 09-56999) 2010 WL 4199736, (discussing
Trinidad y Garcia’s submission to the Secretary of State, but noting that Trinidad y Garcia was
denied the opportunity to appear before any decision making body at the State Department);
accord ABBELL, supra note 10, at 300 (pointing out an extraditee may make submissions to
the Secretary to consider prior to issuing a Surrender Warrant, although there is no right to a
oral hearing).
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